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EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY: DO THE STATES MATTER?

Tatiana Tomova

Abstract

The article explores the issue of the European policies' deliberative character and analyses the challenges the Member States face participating in this process. The idea that the European process depends rather on informal institutions, including on the identifications of participants is developed on the base of the European Employment Strategy analysis. The effectiveness of the common employment policy passes through the ability of States to formulate national priorities and to implement them in the framework of the common process. This capability that is not proven from the National action plans study is related to the States representatives' perceptions of the European process and their own role in it.

Key words: European Employment strategy, deliberation, informal institutions, national priorities, identifications.

European integration is a process that occurs at many levels and multiple arenas (Wallace, Wallace, Pollack, 2005). Its results depend on many actors who take part in more or less structured interactions. In this process composed of multiple processes the role of the Member - States depends on the formal institutions which define their powers (including voting and blocking power) as well as their ability to maximize their own benefit in the field of European policies. This article attempts to define the factors that affect the ability of the Member - States to create benefits for the citizens they represent and assess the capabilities of the Bulgarian State to contribute to solving specific problems of the country.

This research problem is identified because of the fact Bulgaria is different, because of the gap with the average values of the EU indicators, the atypical for European countries pre-emptive development of indicators for the public sector to economic indicators, traditionally high activity on the labor market, values and attitudes of Bulgarian citizens. This makes the country a specific environment for the implementation of EU *acquis communautaires*, where compliance with general rules can not only have results that are seen as unfavorable by the local citizens but also have adverse side effects. In this respect, Bulgaria is not a specific case. What is said about it applies to all other Member - States, but when the economic gap is significant and the Protestant ethic is only known from the literature, the application of general rules goes along with and leads to considerable risks.

In Bulgarian literature about the EU the European integration is interpreted more as a normative rather than a political issue, more as a process of change and implementation of European legislation, rather than a process of achieving common goals at all levels of European

governance. Studies in European law raise the question of legal integration and the specific problem of introducing it into the inner regulatory environment. This research perspective includes in the analysis the active role of domestic institutions, but mostly in regards to the demand for regulatory compliance. The basic thesis is the supremacy of EU law over national legislation which gives domestic institutions the part of the executors nevertheless the process depends on internal political institutions and actors.

Existing Bulgarian political science researches on European integration for the most part follow the logic of traditional Political science and mostly analyse the division of power in the horizontal and vertical plan. This point of view makes a significant difference between issues and topics to which the community approach was undertaken and those remaining areas of State competence. In this way in the areas of transmitted competence the role of States as independent political entities is limited to participation in the decision-making. Areas that remain according to European law a responsibility of the Member - States remain outside of the scope of research. This article follows a different perspective. It is not focused on the formal institutions that are subject to both legal and traditional political studies of European integration. Within this article they are only the rules which define the environment for interaction between multiple actors of different nature and behavior. The analysis follows the New institutionalist logic according to which informal institutions - repetitive practices, values, symbols and identification are important to the European process (Bulmer, 1998). Such an analysis is more focused on participants' behavior rather than on formal rules and political structures that outlining their role but do not give it weight.

New institutionalism enters the field of European research not by coincidence in the 90s. This is the time when the political construction of the EU began. No matter how similar it was to the existing representative democracy models, had to go through new forms of political governance and collective action. The three simultaneously opposing and complementary schools - Rational choice, Constructivism and Historical institutionalism are used to explain the emerging European politics as a response to theoretical deficits of influential at this point Intergovernmentalism and New functionalism (Pollack M. A., 2008). New institutionalism became very influential in the analysis of European Comitology where practices are more important than formal institutions and in the analysis of the EU expansion, where questions like "Why the EU started negotiations in the presence of obvious budgetary and institutional risks?" and " What would be the effect of the negotiations and eventual membership for the reforms in the countries - candidates?" require the use of new theoretical paradigm.

This article seeks to answer the question of the challenges faced by the governance of the Member - States, which remain accountable for their citizens' collective goals achievement in a condition of relative autonomy and independence within the economic and political community. The answer of this question is not connected to any formal vertical division of EU power nor to the improvement of the political structures of representative democracy on Community or State level. The answer lies in the ability of the state representatives to participate in the process of European policies and contribute to maximize the benefit for citizens on the territory in their competences. This means not to just participate in the vertical EU power but to also be actively present in the process of learning, lesson drawing and on this basis – be able to define collective goals of the political community they represent and to introduce them in the European policies. Europeanisation is not (just!) a process of transposition of EU law or of change of the institutional culture and structures. There is a third pillar in the process of change of the States under the influence of the European community - their attempt to actively adapt to the EU. This is an on-the-fly adjustment because the Union is a dynamic system. It is developing though as much as a top-down process - from the *acquis communautaires* to the legal and institutional systems of the Member - States, as a bottom-up process - from the States and their ability to participate actively in the whole cycle of European policies towards the creation and development of the European economic and political system as a whole. Europeanisation is a process of changing the conditions for inclusion in the integration process but also a process of creation of results that turn the EU into a dynamic and comprehensive economic, political and social system. These results are not created bottom-up nor are they created in the opposite direction. They are created in the process of European political governance. This process is linear with multiple actors who recognize each other and exchange interests and influence, thus creating benefits and providing services to European citizens and their associations¹.

Understanding the European integration process as a results-oriented process makes the question of the behavior of representatives of the states a central problem of European studies. This in turn makes the New institutionalism fundamental theoretical paradigm in this research area. This is evident in fields which, according to European law are of State or special competence, although it is valid according to our opinion for the European process as a whole.

¹ For this article purposes the Rhodes definition of governance (Rhodes R. A. W., 1997) that is not developed specifically for European process is used.

In the areas of State competence, even in the presence of an institutionalized mechanism for formulating and implementing common policies, practices are more important than institutions, the behavior is more important than formal rules, which puts the State representatives in a position that depends on their ideas, identifications and professional competencies. Such fields is the common employment policy that is developed through the European Employment Strategy (EES) and National employment plans (NEPs) - documents developed only as a step in the overall process of structured interaction between supranational and State representatives.

Identification of the autonomous behaviour of the Member - States in the European process issue as a research problem may incorrectly be perceived as part of the scientific and political debate between “Federalists” and “Subsidiarists”. In fact the problem raised does not relate to the division of power in the EU but to the ability to develop rational and feasible policies that lead to favorable results for the European integration. This is not a question of at what level - State or Community, to make and implement the decisions, but a question of how to set up common actions and to minimize risks to the Community and to limit the centrifugal tendencies in it. The thesis of this article is that the answer comes from the ability of States to define national priorities and to achieve them within the European process. Achieving national goals is not (necessarily!) to compromise the achievement of the European ones. Rather, achieving common European goals is made possible through the realization of national priorities. This suggests they may be defined simultaneously in a common process in which each community speaks through its own representatives and thus participating in the elaboration of common policies. This suggests also the European integration should not be perceived as a bureaucratic- in Weberian sense process that goes top to bottom in conditions of hierarchical political power and distributed between Community and State level competences, but as a form of deliberation and policy learning between participants from all levels of European governance.

***The vertical cycle of the Common employment policy:
from the Commission through the States to the results and back***

European employment policy develops to respond to both market and social problems (Taylor-Gooby P., 2003). It has significant social impacts, particularly as regards the inclusion of groups with special needs and young people to the labor market. At the same time, and above all, the common policy of employment maintains competition within the European economic space and creates conditions for free movement of companies and people by bridging and binding the

national labor markets that are characterized both with different quantity and quality of labour supply and demand and with the presence of specific institutions.

The development of the common employment policy began in the late 80s as part of the creation of the Common European market. It is a response to the problem identified as "social dumping": "a practice involving the export of goods from a country with weak or poorly enforced labour standards, where the exporter's costs are artificially lower than its competitors in countries with higher standards, hence representing an unfair advantage in international trade. It results from differences in direct and indirect labour costs, which constitute a significant competitive advantage for enterprises in one country, with possible negative consequences for social and labour standards in other countries"². Social dumping lies is the basis for introduction of common minimum standards which aim to reduce the differences in labor costs within the common market and thereby to restore the jeopardized competitiveness of companies that are at a loss from maintaining higher social standards. This is the beginning of development of the first pillar of the employment policy³ which supports the rights related to employment through the introduction of secondary legislation made under a specific procedure that is a variant of the Community method (Rhodes M., 2005).

Regardless of the social implications in terms of quality of work and life of the workforce, the introduction of common standards of the rights related to employment may have adverse consequences for firms, sectors and economies that rely on low labor costs. In the immediate term they enter into conflict with the maintenance of employment in these markets. In the long term their beneficial effects are not guaranteed - they depend on the ability of the political institutions and the administration to manage the process of achieving collective goals. Improving the quality of the employment may lead to a dynamic development depending on the behavior of economic agents and especially on their mobility and their decision to remain in the internal market of goods, services and labour. This decision is in direct relation to the ability of the governance to maintain favorable economic and social environment in which employment quality is only one aspect of the whole.

² <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/SOCIALDUMPING.htm>

³ The common employment policy analysis follows the above quoted approach of H. Wallace , W. Wallace and M. Pollack that is based on the idea the common policy go off as "a series of policy models" that jointly produce the European integration results. Thus the common employment policy runs as a legislative process at European level, a collective bargaining and a soft compliance via European Employment Policy. The three processes lead to a same result but go off differently – on the base of different institutions and through the interaction between different participants.

Because of the institutional features of the first pillar of the employment policy, the variations and possibilities for adaptation of the Member States are slim. They must maintain the minimal and higher standards of rights related to employment. Objectives related to safe and healthy working conditions enter into State public policies as mandatory and achieving them can create problems that should be further identified and resolved through the instruments of governance.

The other pillar of the employment policy began to develop in the late 90s. Within a very short period - no more than a decade in total, in the common employment policy a new process took form with a new institutional design that substantially differs from the traditional Community method of creating European policies: it is the beginning of the soft law within the European employment Strategy (EES) and the coordination of national employment policies. This new pillar of the Common employment policy is seen as an experimental method for creation of European policies, which simultaneously solves two problems of the European governance: the formulation and achievement of common goals becomes possible without legislative change of competencies on one hand; on the other a common action is taken on a policy issue in which the Member States have very different, even contradictory institutional tradition.

Why is the change in competence impossible? In the period between Maastricht and Amsterdam treaty, between the Social Protocol and the Employment chapter, the European employment debate on the common social policy, in which scope the employment policy falls, is intricately structured by two cleavages. On one side is the argument between liberals and social democrats, on the other - between "Federalists" and "Subsidiarists". Ultimately four "camps" are outlined (Rhodes M., 2005), which became insurmountable obstacle for the legal change of competences in employment policy field.

The other obstacle to common employment policy is related to the institutional tradition of the Member States. The 90s were a period of serious challenges to the troubled Western Welfare States. They are simultaneously faced with three problems that cannot be solved simultaneously. Furthermore, through familiar tools of governance in the Member States the resolution of one of them is usually at the expense of one of the other two. This is called a "service sector trilemma", which indicates the conflict between employment growth, maintaining the wages level and compliance with budgetary constraints. The outlining of the trilemma is a consequence of the change in economy and technology, and especially of the expansion of the services sector, which changes the structure of employment and the formation and distribution of added value created in

the real sector. Despite the myths of the collapse of the Western Welfare States that were popular the 80s, the Member States adapt to emerging problems and respectively solve the trilemma while maintaining their institutional traditions. Western Welfare States retrench without losing their institutional characteristics (Esping-Andersen G., (ed.), 1996).

As a consequence of this "Path dependence" the Member States adopt different strategies for coping with emerged trilemma. The Anglo-Saxon countries take measures to adjust the regulations in respect of wages, the Nordic countries continue their policies of employment creation, continental European countries maintain high labor costs but lose their capacity to create employment (Rhodes M., 2005). This behavior of the Member States is encoded in the characteristics of their industrial relations and their legacy regulations on the labor market (Table 1).

Table 1. Institutions of the labor market in the EU Member States (based on Rhodes M., 2005)

	<i>Industrial Relations</i>	<i>Regulations of the labor market⁴</i>
<i>Anglo-Saxon countries</i>	Statutory limitations on government regulation	Flexibility
<i>Scandinavian countries</i>	Corporate negotiation	Flexibility and security
<i>Continental European countries</i>	Public regulations	Security
<i>Countries of Central and Eastern Europe</i>	State regulations in conditions of weak representation of both sides: employees and employers	Security at relatively low cost ⁵

Central and Eastern Europe States build the institutions of their own labor markets in the 90s in the conditions of a wide open window of opportunity, which makes the radical change of policy possible⁶. From the mixture of factors conflicting in its impact, in these countries emerges a specific model that blends seemingly incompatible characteristics - low corporate representation with highly developed state regulations.

⁴ This indicator structures specifically the families between European countries and makes the following groups: Anglo-Saxon, European Nord, and European South. The difference with the groups shown in the Column 1 of the Table is shaped from the borderline case of Germany that combines public regulations with both flexibility and security on labour market.

⁵ This result is not identified by M. Rhodes. It is added by this article author.

⁶ This is the John Kingdom expression, used to explain the particular situation where due to the simultaneously changes in politics, technology and knowledge the Path dependence is broken and the radical policy change becomes achievable. In the Central and Eastern Europe countries such window of opportunities was opened in terms of political and economic transition during 90s.

The existence of some institutional models of the labor market in the Member States renders impossible both the negative integration through the liberalisation of employment relations, and the positive integration through the establishment of common institutions. The common model is not evident. The European Employment Strategy, that marks the change in the common policy from protection to creation of employment, is an innovative policy process which allows the formulation and achievement of common goals in the conditions of missing prerequisites for the rallying the participants around common values and shared vision. It is the policy response which overcomes the contradictions in the political debate and creates conditions for development of objectives and instruments that would simultaneously target the issue of job-creation in and by all State-members. As ineffective as it sometimes seems, the European Employment Strategy (Trubek D. M. and J. Mosher, 2001) cannot to be replaced with anything else because of the insoluble problems faced by the European governance in employment field.

Its characteristics as an innovative method of European governance replicate features of the public policy theoretical concept.

- It is not a form of government. Its development as a process implies a heterarchical participation of actors. Participants are legally defined, but are in linear, equal relationship. Thinking about the participants as hierarchically subordinated distorts the European Employment Strategy and is at the expense of her performance.

- The process of the European Employment Strategy involves both vertical and horizontal policy integration across the EU's multi-level polity. It involves organisations from the Community and State levels of governance, which in turn interact with their social partners. Inadequate representation of the social partners in the process may be at the expense of EES performance

- Strategy as a process, not just as content, develops as problem-solving. It starts with the identification of the problem and ends with evaluation of the results of actions taken. In procedural perspective, it is constructed so as to identify and resolve new emerging problems. The lack of identification of new problems decreases the EES effectiveness.

- European Employment Strategy's logic is based on deliberation and "policy learning", which involves an assessment of results and development of the new strategy on this basis, taking into account induced economic and social changes. The formulation of the same goals at the resumption of the policy cycle without taking into account factors that have influenced their achievement, renders the EES process meaningless and decrease the quality of its performance

- EES as a process and content involves use of benchmarking and reference to "best practices". Using these methods as part of the procedure increases its effectiveness because it stimulates coordination and ultimately convergence through the introduction of common benchmarks for advancement.

There are similarities and significant differences between the European Employment Strategy and the Open Method of Coordination, which is defined as an additional method for the common policies making (Table 2). Both contain the linear logic of public policies, both are non-binding, but differ in the degree of structuring, procedural orderliness and normative commitment. In this sense, the European Employment Strategy as a process allows relatively small variations in national policies because it introduces common objectives and indicators for their achievement. Both processes, however, placed the Member States and their representatives in the same situation: joining them presents a challenge both to their professional and political competences. The ability to participate in a non-binding process of formulation and implementation of common goals requires skills and identifications that allow independent behavior as a representative of a political entity. The behavior of an administrative servant destroys the logic of European integration in the field of employment, not only because it does not allow the achievement of specific objectives of the Member State, but also because it diminishes the effectiveness of the process as a whole. Lack of adequate conduct of the representatives of the Member States is at the expense of both their own political entity and the European process.

Table. 2. European Employment Strategy and the Open Method of Coordination (Rhodes M., 2005, p. 291)

	<i>EES</i>	<i>OMC</i>
<i>Source of legitimacy</i>	Legal	Political
<i>Legal or political</i>	Treaty of Amsterdam: Employment Title	Lisbon Summit (2000)
<i>Policy area</i>	Employment	Social inclusion; Pensions; Education; Research and innovation;
<i>Policy aim</i>	One-dimensional	Multi-dimensional
<i>Instrumental differences</i>	Stronger	Weaker

As a process the European Employment Strategy goes in steps that occur at different levels of European governance. Their sequence sets the vertical cycle of this pillar of the common employment policy⁷.

1. The process begins at Community level with the identification of common problems. The Agenda setting depend most heavily on the Rotating Presidency and the Commission. At this first step the Commission develops general ideas about the best employment strategy for EU Member States to pursue. The Commission develops these ideas in discussions with the Council of EU, Member States, the relevant social actors such as unions and employer's organisations, and academics.

2. On the base of the ongoing benchmarking the Commission proposes Guidelines approved after that by the Council of EU. Since 2003 the Guidelines are developed and approved in form of result-oriented priorities. Specific guidelines are drawn up indicating actions that Member States should take to modify their national employment policies. This is where the EES takes concrete form. An attempt is made to produce a multi-area strategy cutting across a range of domains that affect employment such as taxation policies, unemployment policies, education policies, and gender policies. Commission must formally consult the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, and the Employment Committee before releasing the final version of the proposed guidelines.

3. Every year Governments of Member States develop the National Action Plans (NAPs). Each Member State draws up NAP for taking the guidelines into account in their employment policies.

4. The measures planned in NAPs are implemented at national level.

5. Each year the Commission examines the implementation of the guidelines by the Member States. It uses the National Action Plans, implementation reports, and its own inquiries to assess compliance. Annual peer review of the NAP is done in the "Cambridge process" framework. Programmes on active labour market policies (from 1999 onwards) are peer reviewed as well as. Based on its assessment, the Commission can propose to the Council that recommendations be directed at the Member States. Such recommendation can be passed in Council of EU with QMV.

⁷ The EES process is reconstructed on the base of M. Rhodes (Rhodes M., 2005) and D. M. Trubek (Trubek David M. and James Mosher, 2001) works.

6. At the end of the annual cycle, the Commission and the Council write a Joint Employment Report on the employment situation in the Union and on the implementation of the guidelines by the Member States.

7. While the Joint Employment Report is being written guidelines for the upcoming year are being developed and the cycle begins again. It is also at this point that the Commission can revise its theory of what is hindering European employment, identify new best practices occurring in Member States, and modify its overall strategic outlook.

The stepwise process of the EES embraces five major governance objectives (Trubek DM and Mosher J., 2001):

- Promote learning by creating conditions for continuous improvement of the process and the level of achievement of goals related to employment;
- Enhance coordination among levels of government by creating conditions for the simultaneous achievement of community objectives and objectives of the Members by the decomposition of guidelines into national priorities, and then through the development of joint plans for employment based on monitoring and evaluation of the results from the implementation of national policy measures;
- Integrate separate policy domains by targeting the employment issue via different sectoral policies;
- Enhance participation by opening the process to multiple participants at all levels of European governance;
- Ultimately promote convergence while allowing diversity⁸.

Achievement of these objectives however is hypothetical. They are included in the model, but may not be realized if they violate the linear logic of the process and the Commission turns from administrator of the process into its political leader. The possibilities for such change in roles accompany most of all the steps that are implemented at state level (steps 3-5 according to the above presented order) and depend on the ability of the State representatives to participate in the process of policy learning and deliberation. Such capability is not and cannot be embedded in the model, but rather depends on the values, knowledge and identifications of the participants in the process.

⁸ The goals in Guideline 2003 are reconstructed on the base of quoted M. Rhodes work.

The changed roles in the European employment strategy can be identified by the following indicators:

- The coincidence between the common and national goals, which may be expressed in the absence of specific identified problems, target groups, measures, anticipated results in the national action plans on employment;
- Lack of development of national objectives in time, which is due to the lack of specific analysis of the situation and the changes in it.

National priorities in the European Employment Strategy

Existing studies on the impact of the EES on national employment policies are focused mainly on the degree of compliance achieved. Usually, they question the effectiveness of the Strategy and make it dependent on the convergence of measures that countries take to achieve their goals in the sphere of employment. Behind this approach lies the assumption that the Strategy's objectives can be achieved through the adoption and implementation of similar in content policy instruments. In this way the strategic and operational objectives are mixed and the question of the effectiveness of policies is replaced with the question of implementation of eligible measures.

This research approach to a great extent corresponds to the adopted policy approach. Still at European level the common goals are decomposed to very concrete targets that minimize the possibility of variations in national policies. This approach is introduced with the launch of the process of the European Employment Strategy and confirmed with those introduced in 2003. The four stands defined in 1997 Employability, Entrepreneurship, Adaptability, Equal opportunities have then been replaced by three objectives: Full employment, Quality and productivity at work and Social cohesion and inclusion decomposed in ten goals:

- Active and preventive measures for the unemployed;
- Job creation and entrepreneurship;
- Address change and promote adaptability and mobility in the labour market;
- Promote development of human capital and lifelong learning;
- Increase labour supply and promote active ageing;
- Gender equality;
- Promote the integration of and combat discrimination;
- Make work pay through incentives to enhance work attractiveness;
- Transform undeclared work into regular employment;

- Address regional employment disparities.

The process of decomposition of the objectives in the Strategy 2003 continues with the introduction of quantified targets as following:

- Every unemployed person to be offered a new start within 6 months of unemployment in the case of young people and 12 months in the case of adults;
- By 2010, 25 percent of the long-term unemployed to participate in an active measure;
- By 2010, at least 85 percent of 22 year olds in the EU should have completed upper secondary education;
- The EU average level of participation in life-long learning should be at least 12.5 percent of the adult working-age population;
- By 2010, achieve an increase, at EU level, of the effective average exit age from the labour market from 60 to 65;
- Provide childcare by 2010 to at least 90 percent of children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age and at least 33 percent of children under 3 years of age;
- Achieve by 2010 an EU average rate of no more than 10 percent early school leavers;
- All job vacancies advertised by national employment services should be accessible and be able to be consulted by anyone in the EU by 2005.

Seemingly the introduced qualified targets are not significantly different from the minimum standards for save and health in work. So what is the difference between flexibility and traditional secondary legislation? And where are the opportunities for states to define and achieve their own priorities?

Unlike the minimum standards which are binding and may be introduced or maintained only as more favorable to employees, quantitative targets are defined specifically. They are required as indicators, but not as a value. That means the countries can define them independently on the basis of expert analysis and in negotiations with the stakeholders. In this way the national priorities correspond to both the analysis of the situation and the attitudes and positions of the social partners. Participation in the process of the European employment strategy does not imply overachieving or transfer of the objective set out in the Guidelines or in the recommendations of the Commission and the Council. The aim is to justify and defend national priority, as set out in the internal process of policy-making. Such an understanding of the presence of the state in the EES process refers mainly to the development of National Action Plan for Employment (step 3 in above represented EES process).

The implementation of NAP (step 4) sets new challenges, which again affect the attitudes of the representatives of the States towards the European integration. Like any process of implementation achievement of the planned results in the sphere of employment and within the European policy is accompanied by risks because of the dynamics of the economic and political environment. There are risks to the achievement of results, but there are also risks to the political governance in other sectors or in relation to other topics. In the process of implementation constant feedback must be maintained so that all possible risks are minimized. This means that the European process should be seen as a process that is managed and not as a process that is being executed.

The need for the European process to be managed has a specific projection in Central and Eastern Europe and especially in Bulgaria. The specificity is a consequence of it being more or less behind in economic and technological aspect, of the relatively lower quality of life, of inherited institutions and of the existing public attitudes. Achieving a high level of employment in conditions of low productivity, limited supply of high-tech jobs and very low wages is a challenge with no obvious solution.

Monitoring and evaluation of NAPs implementation (Step 5) also is of deliberative type. This assessment has nothing to do with the bureaucratic process in which higher authority shall evaluate the implementation of the task. The purpose of this assessment is to improve the process, which means that it should proceed as data sharing and data analysis. Such understanding again gives an active role of the representatives of the States to demonstrate their own contribution to the achievement of common goals.

Studies show that representatives of the countries of Central Europe and the Baltic States understand their presence in the European Employment Strategy as an administrative rather than a political task; as a fulfillment of competencies rather than a participation in deliberative process to develop common policies (Palpant C., 2006). The analysis based on five countries (Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia) with similar trends – low rates of employment, strong regional disparities, large long-term unemployment and the development of the informal economy, shows that, while a lack of time and the technical and financial obstacles have played a role in the situation, three other major reasons also explain the shortcomings:

- The content of the EES itself: for a long time, several problems that are central for the new Member States were given little attention in the EES;

- Insufficient training by the European Commission: its attitude during preparation for accession did not induce a relationship of mutual trust with the national governments, nor, as a consequence, facilitate better expression of the priorities and objectives of the EES.

- Consequently, the EES was often perceived by the new Member States as an administrative exercise, and this has prevented it from reaching its objective of convergence in the Europe of 25.

This long quote is needed there is not yet a similar study on the attitudes of the Bulgarian representatives involved in the EES process. However the analysis of National action plans on employment⁹ shows that the situation is rather similar. If the indicators of changing roles in the deliberative pillar of the employment policy defined above are applied, we can draw the following conclusions:

- No significant difference is found in the objectives formulated in the annual plans for the period 2008 - 2012. The target groups, at which the planned measures are directed, are the same in all yearly developed NAPs.

- The target groups identified in the national employment plans coincide with the groups that the European employment policy defines as disadvantaged on the labor market.

- Specific problems, such as the lack of high tech job supply, are not identified in the plans;

- The names of the reports reiterate the main objectives of the European employment policy, which leads to the fact that two annual reports have the same name, although at the period of time that separates them, the world economy has slipped into crisis.

- The characteristics of the environment in which the planned measures will be applied - low productivity, high share of shadow economy - are not interpreted as risks to achieving the objectives.

In contrast with the quoted study, we believe that the problem is not in the supranational institutions ignoring the specific problems of the new Member States, but rather in the ability or rather the lack of ability to participate in the deliberative process of creating common policies. Overcoming this deficit does not depend on the Commission's conduct; it depends on the development of skills and change in the identification of States representatives. Achieving this goal goes through training and creation of a new generation of civil servants and political representatives who have competence to participate in the European process and identify themselves by the political community that they serve and represent.

⁹ Bulgarian NAP on employment 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012.
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EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF GRAND STRATEGY

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Abstract

Efficiency and effectiveness are fundamental parameters of management that indicate the managed system's overall viability and progress. Therefore their assessment is equally important at each of management's 3 levels – the operational, tactical and strategic one. However, methods for evaluation of efficiency and effectiveness are traditionally better developed at the lower operational level and used daily as something obligatory. Sophisticated quantitative techniques have been applied there since the times of F. W. Taylor. In contrast, the estimation of efficiency and effectiveness of strategies is a rare practice. It does hardly stretch beyond assessment of effectiveness alone based on historical analysis or growth reports that give indirect, relative or partial indication of strategic adequacy. Strategic efficiency is hardly measured at all.

Efficiency and effectiveness are fundamental parameters of management that indicate the managed system's overall viability and progress. Therefore their assessment is equally important at each of management's 3 levels – the operational, tactical and strategic one. However, methods for evaluation of efficiency and effectiveness are traditionally better developed at the lower operational level and used daily as something obligatory. Sophisticated quantitative techniques have been applied there since the times of F. W. Taylor. In contrast, the estimation of efficiency and effectiveness of strategies is a rare practice. It does hardly stretch beyond assessment of effectiveness alone based on historical analysis or growth reports that give indirect, relative or partial indication of strategic adequacy. Strategic efficiency is hardly measured at all.

Are strategies really subscribed to rates of success so high that make systematic and thorough assessment of their effectiveness and efficiency unnecessary? Is there a lasting guarantee that the strategic vision and objectives are reframed timely and accordingly to changing historical circumstances? If any serious doubts in this regard exist, what steps should be made? Are they worth at all?

Presumably, leaders' awareness of current efficiency and effectiveness of particular strategic actions is a matter of utmost importance for securing systemic success. These are effective and efficient strategies that develop common meanings synchronizing processes within the managed system from top to bottom and thus leading to a general multiplier effect. These are effective and efficient strategies that provide those distant horizons of management that make lasting prosperity and security possible. Moreover, in an era of globalization management of big social entities such as entire countries or international economic and political megastructures cannot rely on traditional esteems of operational or even tactical efficiency.

In this context, the more general a strategy, the higher the importance of its parameters are for the managed system's security, advancement and prosperity. Therefore efficiency and effectiveness particularly of grand strategies plays the most crucial role for strategic management

and the overall system of management. Therefore this article is devoted precisely to the assessment of the quality of grand strategies.

Given the spatial and temporal caliber of processes at this highest systemic level it is hard to believe that relevant approaches could be as tangible as those used for measuring operational efficiency and effectiveness. Nonetheless, a maximum operability of the evaluation of effectiveness and efficiency of grand strategies must be secured. This seems possible if the framework of grand strategy evaluation includes a complete and universally applicable set of criteria to compensate the use of incomplete unique facts or statistical data. It is important that those criteria correspond to grand strategy's core sense. They should be an instrument for total assessment of the adequacy of the strategic intent and the price of its realization.

A separate pioneering study like this cannot achieve such goals in their entity. The efforts here are aimed solely at outlining the general framework for analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of grand strategies. For this limited purpose the following problems should be determined sequentially: (1) what is the contemporary meaning of grand strategy, broader than its original close military importance developed against the traditional notion of strategy, (2) how does a universal model of a given state's grand strategy ruling its economic, political and social development look like, and (3) how should this model be operationalized in order to determine the particular domains of effectiveness and efficiency variables. Thus the ultimate aim is to create a framework for further development of specific indicators to be tested in practical research on grand strategy cases.

Grand Strategy as an Object of Assessment

There are two types of strategies -- grand strategies and operational strategies. What has been called grand strategy in the last 4 decades was previously known as "general policy." The first type corresponds to governance's "long waves" that last decades while the second correspond to the span of just a few short years. One is open-ended with no strict termination point, the other -- with a fixed end exactly as plans do. Politicians who are strategic leaders, i.e. statesmen, are related primarily to the first type - the grand strategies of states and supranational groupings.

Grand strategy is not an allegory of a strategy that is simply "more significant" than "regular" ones. It is not "grand" because of having greater spatial or temporal dimensions. Rather, grand strategy differs from all other strategies in a country by having its unique function in the system of state governance. It is the strategy of all strategies: it binds together all sectoral strategies in a system by imposing on them a common sense similarly to the way such "regular" strategies in turn synchronize decisions and actions in separate areas of public activity.

However there is a significant difference between providing a common sense to all specific senses that frame activities in one or other sphere of social life and simply giving a general sense to all activities within a given sphere. The former is grand strategy, "the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state's deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state's national interest."¹ This notion is

¹ Feaver, Peter. What is grand strategy and why do we need it? In: Foreign Policy, April, 2009

opposed to the latter – to specific strategy viewed as “the total pattern of decisions which shape the long-term capabilities of any type of operations and their contribution to the overall strategy.”² Thus grand strategy refers to the supreme level of socio-political reasoning of statesmen, i.e. the higher stratum of strategic governance, while all other strategies constitute a lower stratum of strategic governance. Apparently the higher grand strategic sublevel of state governance answers the question “What should be done” while the lower is concentrated on answering “How this should be done”. Sectoral operational strategies are continuations and specifications of grand strategy. In other words, if a country has a grand strategy, sectoral strategies become its system components.

The modern concept adheres to what military historian B. H. Liddell Hart once wrote: “The role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.”³ Associated with the military context, the original definition of Liddell Hart appears too narrow. If his definition is to be followed strictly, its use should be limited only to big wars that make a country use its full capacity. What happens if there is no clearly identifiable threat? Liddell Hart does not provide tools for defining the policy objective of a grand strategy. It turns out that politics itself is determined in direct relation to a particular enemy in an ongoing conflict! What comes first, and what - second? It is not just that grand strategy comprises the “purposeful employment of all instruments of power available to a security community”⁴ for the mobilization of the economic resources, man-power and even moral resources of nations in order to sustain the fighting capacity per se. “From the outset of forging the concept it was clear that grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace thus binding both in a single purpose.”⁵

Grand strategy is a system of synchronized “normal” strategies that are in equilibrium with each other. However the total effect of all such strategies together is completely different. Grand strategy provides not only the extremum (extreme maximization) behind simple maximum (maximization) like the “regular” strategies do, but exceed even that limit. It secures the continued extreme maximization. This horizon extends beyond maximizing as a goal per se. Each “regular” strategy aims at the extreme. Grand strategy is a prerequisite for achieving multiple ekstrema.

Obviously, due to the substantive differences between grand strategy and sectoral strategies briefly outlined above, issues of effectiveness and efficiency stand quite differently in both. In this context sectoral policies do not differ significantly from tactical and operational management. Sectoral strategies are defined as “plans of action designed to achieve a vision.” This is pretty close to the notion of traditional planning. Plans are designed to achieve interrelated goals of best exploitation of resources and opportunities. The difference is that the vision is a specific set of goals devised to gaining a position of advantage over competitors. In both cases the word is of maximization in a given situation. Efficiency and effectiveness were

² Lewis, M. & Slack, N. Operations strategy (2nd edition). Prentice-Hall, 2008.


³ Liddell Hart, B. H. Strategy London: Faber & Faber, 1967. 2nd rev. ed. p.322

⁴ Gray, Colin: War, Peace and International Relations - An Introduction to Strategic History, Abingdon and New York: Routledge 2007, p. 283.

⁵ Ibid.

originally industrial engineering and later business concepts designed exactly to measure maximization. Therefore the measurement of both parameters of sectoral strategies is well known.

What is Strategic effectiveness in this relatively simple and familiar context – strategy seen as a plan for achieving of goals? Most often it is defined as a “way of thinking and acting as an organization to ensure the achievement of its vision, mission, and goals.”⁶ It follows that strategic effectiveness is an organization's ability to set the right goals and consistently achieve them. This effectiveness is seen as the outcome of a three-stage process:



The Formulation Stage of strategic effectiveness assesses the current situation, develops a clear strategic direction for the future, and formulates a strategic map for how the organization achieves that direction. Some consulting models refer to this stage as strategic planning. It is driven by 3 quite well known questions classical in strategic management: What is the current situation? What is the future the organization is trying to create? What is the strategic map for achieving this future? The Implementation Stage focuses on effective implementation of the strategic priorities and objectives outlined in the strategic map. The Review and Adjust Stage provides regular opportunities to adapt both the strategy and the approach to implementation to meet ever-changing realities.

However, grand strategy of a state is something completely different and requires a different approach to the definition of efficiency and effectiveness.

Unlike sectoral strategies it provides a result exceeding maximization. Grand strategy aims at the extremum, not the maximum. This is the maximax, i.e. the maximum with greatest possible value in the most favorable situation among few. Still, grand strategy does not stop even at this point. It aims to provide extreme maximization not once but repeatedly over a long period of time.

In this context grand strategy motivates specific decisions made today that will lead to the accumulation of profits beyond today's highs at some point tomorrow. This effect is achieved through the retreat from direct maximization or control of change in the name of reaching the extreme in a future moment, that is, the maximal maximum. Moreover, grand strategy is not

⁶Fallon, Tim. Strategic Effectiveness Overview. TCI Consulting Partners, 2005. <http://www.performance-vision.com/step/webinars/TimFallon-StrategicEffectivenessOverview.doc>

about a single achievement of this extreme but rather about the long-term positioning at the extreme heights. This means systematic achievement of extreme maximization. Thus grand strategy causes a multiplier effect of securing a chain of accumulated extreme peaks. This strategic effect explains the historical "miracles" like the German one after World War II or South Korea in the 1960s. Grand strategy becomes the main instrument of statesmanship. For the past 2500 years strategizing at the highest level has been the art of success of states and nations. Where no miracles happen, the only equivalent source of success is following a grand strategy.

This context above outlines grand strategy in the light of political economy. However there exists another context, equivalent to political economy in terms of importance but opposite as core sense - the moral economy. Maximizing benefits is no longer of central importance. Instead, moral economy's basis is self-actualization, self improvement, the triumph of the unique value system, featuring the particular state and nation. Both individuals and nations seek not only to maximize benefits but also sustainable self-identification and, when possible, cultural domination.⁷ The achievements in this regard are usually not ranked higher or lower than maximization and economic development. The chain of grand strategic goals in this context includes cultural survival as the minimum achievement, if possible – development, reinforcement and adaptation of the own identity and when circumstances allow, regional or global cultural dominance.

All this means that grand strategy keeps and defends the essence of the mission that the nation believes and is believed to carry. It develops further that mission to a certain extent adapting it to new historical circumstances. However most important is that grand strategy is the system by which the mission is carried out. This is why grand strategy is an instrument of persistent actualization of the nation's unique nature. Viewed this way, grand strategy has no endpoint and should not never have it. Grand strategy is about development and not about any type of final collective welfare status. Therefore it should be perceived as organization of the constant process of national self-realization. This processual specificity of grand strategy makes it have intermediate targets that follow from an overall strategic intent rather than some sort of a great final goal.

Grand strategy is not a tool for achieving predetermined endpoints— those final states just mentioned – in contrast to regular sectoral strategies. This makes grand strategy far from being a plan. Despite this fact it is not an amorphous formation. It does fix (though fixes it in a flexible way) a strong intention – motivation for national self-realization, development and welfare in a given unique format designed and motivated on the basis of what this nation perceives as its specific values. Pursuing tendencies instead of a final goal still produces goals, however these are many consecutive goals: grand strategy is an instrument of gradual setting chains of goals. Normally these goals are intended for a relatively distant, less familiar and vaguely controlled environment. No plan for 50 years ahead is possible for that reason as nothing definite is known for such a distant period in future. The formulation of those goals stemming from the grand strategic intention depends simultaneously on the expected parameters of not well known future

⁷ See for example the Republic of Armenia's National Security Strategy: it ranks the preservation of Armenian national identity among its highest priorities. Chancellor Adenauer insisted on integrity of Germany based on "Western Christian" values.

situations as well as strong own preferences and intentions. Conversely, planning is a chain of reactions, as rational and objective as possible, to expected situations in a relatively well known, controlled environment.

Grand strategy is the long winding and endless road of national self-assertion, development and well being that is enshrined in the unique set of values known as mission. The dynamics of this process requires continuous change of objectives within what is created ad hoc as grand strategic plan, depending on the situations of constant competition. Forming and implementing the grand strategy does not follow a script. In contrast to this classical strategic planning, characteristic of the formation and implementation of sectoral strategies is not more than a means of transforming inputs into output conditions and results in making the best use of resources. According to this quite common view strategy is a plan, scheme, a series of actions to be taken to achieve the objectives contained in a comprehensive plan for a long period of time organizational levels.

The creation of a grand strategy is a floating, diffuse and gradual process of gradual development of the strategy itself, not a completed first step before implementation. Regular rationality of setting first goals and then making them come true does not apply here. Grand strategic thinking has quite different prerequisites like values and copes with considerable uncertainty. Still, the gradual creation of a grand strategy steps on several solid points. An initial momentum inevitably exists and that is the concept of general direction of national self actualization and well being which form a preliminary strategic intent. The origin of this starting point is national culture, or specific values on which there is broad consent. The barely emerging grand strategy so far at this early stage is a relatively well-defined strategic mission and an outline of a strategic vision rough-hewn on the basis. Usually this stage of early formative development of grand strategy is the product of the lives of grand national strategic leaders. From that moment on, the strategy is formed gradually in the process of its implementation. Leaders interpret new situations in the light of the grand strategic intent and past practices and thus shape the socio-political, economic and cultural models that materialize further the body of the grand strategy developed. New strategic elements and practices are gradually accumulated and thus the strategy gains integrity as well as vitality. This view is gaining more momentum and is known as "strategy as practice."⁸

The following summary about the modern political concept of grand strategy can be made. Grand strategy provides not only the maximum benefits for the nation but stretches beyond it by securing the extreme values of maximization. However it exceeds even that limit. Grand strategy is about systematic extreme maximization in long time periods. As a system of synchronized "regular" (sectoral) strategies it develops a state of equilibrium among such strategies. The overall effect of all those strategies bound by grand strategy is completely different from a sum of separate extreme maximizations. It has two faces, one on political economy, other things - the moral economy: sustainable development and strong national identity. These two sides of the coin known as grand strategy are made possible by means of securing a lasting competitive advantage and strategic partnership in a globalized setting.

⁸ See for instance Jarzabkowski, Paula. Strategy as practice: Recursiveness, adaptation and strategic practices-in-use. Aston University, Birmingham. July 2002

Towards Models of Effectiveness and Efficiency Grand Strategy

It is well known that, for most organizational levels, goals are operative (functional), aimed at organizing the efficient management of processes. These objectives determine the meaning of actions. They do not identify the general reason of existence of the entire system by formulating a clear cut mission. Such operative non-strategic goals are depending almost totally on the shift of situations⁹ and therefore constantly changing. Thus conventional strategies (not to mention plans at the tactical and operational level) form goals relating to profit (efficiency, market shares), output (the “end product” or services provided), functions (the performance of objectives and desired behaviours within an organization) and the like.

However this is not true for the supreme level of public management. Grand strategy goals neither directly depend on situations nor relate to separate operations. It is only grand strategy that has the whole system as its object. Its mission is the preservation of the system and where possible its supremacy over other systems. In his classification of goals, strategy guru Henry Mintzberg defines such goals as “system goals”. He stated that there are 4 system goals – “survival, efficiency, control, and growth.”

Mintzberg is not the only one who noticed that survival and growth are the integral super-objectives of each system. I have never seen a more compact judgment by the thought of the famous conductor and intellectual Pierre Boulez's of what life is about is, “The goal of life is not happiness; it is existence.”¹⁰ – often defined as domination by political systems. The supreme reason of system management is existence and growth. Grand strategy specifies the parameters of this common sense and transfers it to the lower levels of government. Grand strategy of a society shall specify its unique mission, why this mission is a particular value, i.e. why it is worth it to be realized. Along with this, grand strategy forms further the vision for the overall development of this society and the ways its socio-political model could dominate globally.

So if we talk about the “grand” effect that a grand strategy achieves, it appears as a minimum to be the very survival of the public model which it builds; if favorable conditions exist survival is complemented by growth and finally dominance of the system over the rest of systems in its milieu. Accordingly, the degree of achievement and progress in this direction should be the framework of grand strategy effectiveness.

This general definition of effectiveness of the higher strategic level should be operationalized to serve the main task of this research – the creation of a framework for evaluating effectiveness and efficiency. Goals of this higher level, the effectiveness and efficiency of which is to be assessed, are not monolithic.

Firstly, system goals are directed inwards and outwards. To succeed in achieving a system's goal, there must be an inward reason as well as an outward process of achievement of the desired outcome. A goal for the system itself in relation to other systems is what we call an ‘outward’ goal. An outward goal is achieved if backed by an inward goal. Inner goals define the

⁹ See for instance Charles Perrow's classification of multiple organizational goals consisting of Output, system, Product, and Derived goals

¹⁰ Matthew Fox, The Goal of Life is Living, Inward/outward, 03-25-2010

system's reason for being and secure the inner factors of system integrity. Outward goals with no inward goal cannot be fulfilled.¹¹

Second, higher values of the system are so general that they are in fact a unity of value and rational reasoning. At this higher level, the reason of existing merges with the direction of development, i.e. the answer of the question "What?" coincides with the answers to the question "How?" Therefore, the goals of grand strategy fall simultaneously within the domains of what is called moral economy and political economy. Briefly, moral economy is considered the sphere of cultural beliefs motivating behavior (value based goals) while political economy is traditionally seen as the sphere of rational (maximizing) economic and political motives influencing behavior (interest based goals).

A simple matrix can be constructed on this basis which frames the aspects of the effectiveness of grand strategy:

Moral Economy ↓		Political Economy ↓		
Goals	Inward Oriented →	1	2	Effective- ness
	Outward Oriented →	3	4	

where

- cell 1 corresponds to inward oriented moral goal of grand strategy
- cell 2 corresponds to inward oriented political and economic goal of grand strategy
- cell 3 corresponds to outward oriented moral goal of grand strategy
- cell 4 corresponds to outward oriented political and economic goal of grand strategy

The degree to which each of these goals is achieved shows the degree of effectiveness of a grand strategy.

If effectiveness of grand strategy is assessed by the rate of achievement of its goals, its efficiency is evaluated by the rate of rationality¹² of the methods by which these goals are achieved.

¹¹ David Samuel, Why You Need To Know Your Outward and Inward Goal Before You Can Succeed, Entrepreneur Monk, April 9, 2009

¹² In the paradigm of maximizing behavior

The methods of grand strategy may vary but generally fall into two major groups: competition and cooperation. Both are applied simultaneously by statesmen: grand strategy defines certain countries as permanent rivals, others as permanent strategic partners who share the same key values. Sustainable competitive advantage cannot be ensured without the support of its partners.

Again a simple matrix can be constructed on this basis which frames the aspects of the efficiency of grand strategy:

Moral Economy		Political Economy		
↓		↓		
Methods	Cooperation →	1	2	Efficiency
	Competition →	3	4	

where

- cell 1 corresponds to strategic cooperation in the moral sphere
- cell 2 corresponds to strategic cooperation in the political and economic sphere
- cell 3 corresponds to strategic competition in the moral sphere
- cell 4 corresponds to strategic competition in the political and economic sphere

The degree of rationality of these groups of method (i. e. best ratio of resources used to results achieved) shows the degree of efficiency of a grand strategy.

Towards a General Model of Grand Strategy Efficiency and Effectiveness

The general contents of these theoretically constructed cells of the abstract models of grand strategy effectiveness and efficiency is as follows:

Effectiveness of Grand Strategy Goals

1. The *inward oriented moral* goal of grand strategy is reinforcing national and cultural identity. It is the paramount goal which is at the forefront in the whole chain of goal setting in management. It relates to self-determination of the subject of grand strategy and therefore leads to the formulation of the strategic mission: “how one construes oneself in the present expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one construes

oneself as one aspires to be in the future.”¹³ National identity relates to the collective self-image that shapes the mental model of the nation, and this model forms the most important prerequisite of all that follows -- subjectivity, “the totality of one's self-construal”¹⁴ i.e. turns the nation into a subject of strategy. National identity creates the capacity for collective self-reflection and the collective awareness of self.¹⁵

The Inward oriented in the Moral Economy domain: Reinforcing National and Cultural Identity.

2. The *inward oriented* goal of grand strategy in the *Political Economy* domain is sustainable economic and institutional development. After securing the fundamental condition, well developed subjectiveness of the nation, the next most important tasks are the economic progress and stable government institutions. All these goals cannot exist without each other -- no nation exists as a viable subject without economic development and no sustainable development of the national economy is possible without steady government institutions.

3. The *outward oriented moral* goal of grand strategy is the protection of national identity and, where possible, cultural expansion. The national security strategies of some countries with large diaspora can serve as a good example in this regard¹⁶. There are particularly clear examples in the sphere of production of TV series, music, etc.

4. The *outward oriented* goal of grand strategy in the *Political Economy* domain is national security and economic expansion. In this context, national security should be interpreted in a broader sense than its narrow defensive core. Security is the reverse side of the same coin it shares with economic competitiveness. Thus interpreted, security has a positive effect as well. It is the result of the special position of the state in global politics and global market that provides sustainable maximization for the national economy as a whole.

Grand strategy effectiveness is securing all these 4 goals of grand strategy. Indicators should be further developed for the assessment of the progress made in the realization of each of them.

Efficiency of Grand Strategy Methods

1. The method of cooperation used for realization of grand strategic goals in the moral economy domain is securing national consent and active participation in the development of a strategic coalition based on shared values.

2. The method of cooperation used for realization of grand strategic goals in the Political Economy domain is Good Governance.

The comparative analysis of different concepts of Good Governance¹⁷ and the ensuing "lists" of its basic properties reveals the following frequency characteristics, respectively highlights the contents of a generalized concept:

¹³ Weinreich, 1986

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Leary & Tangney, 2003

¹⁶ See the NSS of the Republic of Armenia for example

¹⁷ Own research based on relevant documents of The World Bank, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, OECD, UN, EC.

Rank	Features of Good Governance	Number of references
I.	Accountability, transparency, responsibility for managing the public	19
II.	Participation, inclusiveness, representation of different social groups	14
III.	Effectiveness and efficiency of management	10
IV.	Rule of Law	8
V.	Capacity, competence management	6
VI.	Stability, predictability, reliability of management actions	5
VII.	Consent consensus in the balance as a basis of three management	2
VIII.	Responsiveness of management Control of Corruption	2
IX.	Vision, perspective	2

The model makes impression with its asymmetry. Contrary to what could normally be expected, the existing concept of Good Governance emphasizes twice stronger all possible aspects of legality and legitimacy of government (its democracy, fairness and balance) than its rationality (efficiency, stability and capacity). Good Governance is a political, not a management concept. In this perspective, the so-called moral economy contents prevails decisively over the economic one in the “official” concept of good governance.

3. The method of competition used for realization of grand strategic goals in the Moral Economy domain is maintenance of a constant global initiative. The same means “agenda writing” or “surprise” in the categories of Clausewitz. The simplification of the model of management reduces the sense of its strategic level down to a simple process of goals achievement. This is due to the excessive rationalism. The rational person accepts unreservedly the attainment of objectives when consistent with objective reality, but is suspicious to the setting of targets perceived as too subjective. In grand strategy’s formative context, however, goal setting loses its objectivity. Strategic goals are not as tactical or operational ones attained strictly in accordance with objective conditions. Strategic goals are built on values, so their achievement leads to self-determination. Simple measurement of performance does not serve the goal of assessing a strategy’s efficiency and effectiveness.¹⁸ Strategy formulation and realization is a political process¹⁹, a “discontinuous” one (Mintzberg). Through trial and error the successful actions gradually selected become the permanent model of foreign and domestic policy. This model combines the initial value priorities with the general characteristics of the situation.

4. The method of competition used for realization of grand strategic goals in the Political Economy domain is providing sustainable competitive advantage over competitors in an environment filled with change and challenges. Achieving a privileged position (well illustrated by the famous bridgehead or strategic heights of the military) is the only chance for the state to enhance its resistance against its competitors – other states of relatively similar capabilities, i.e. relatively equal in opportunities, resources, organization or power. The equality makes this task very difficult to be achieved by a country alone without support of strategic partners. By guaranteeing sustainable competitive advantage grand strategy is able to secure the survival of

¹⁸ See simple tools as <http://www.managementstudyguide.com/strategy-evaluation.htm>







¹⁹ Andrew Pettigrew, in:

<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/41103852?uid=3737608&uid=2&uid=4&sid=56240274073>

the national identity, the sustainable development of the economy and certain levels of cultural as well as economic expansion. This in turn means that grand strategy promotes the implementation of the mission, i.e. the health of its unique nature. Viewed this way, grand strategy has no endpoint. Rather it is a process – a process of constant “self-actualization” of national specificity and sustainable development of national economy.

Each of these methods realizes each of the grand strategy’s goals. However there exists some parallelism: goal 1 is best secured by method 1, etc.

The overall model of Effectiveness – Efficiency of grand strategy looks this way:

Moral Economy		Political Economy		
				
Goals	Inward Oriented 	Reinforcing National and Cultural Identity	Sustainable Economic and Institutional Development	Effective-ness
	Outward Oriented 	Protection of National Identity and Cultural Expansion	National Security and Economic Expansion	
Methods	Cooperation 	National Consent and Strategic Coalition	Good Governance	Efficiency
	Competition 	Global Initiative	Sustainable Competitive Advantage	

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POLICY IMPLEMENTATION CAPACITY: REFORMS' TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE¹

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Abstract

In the beginning we need to address *three questions*: what we mean by policy implementation, and what is the relationship of implementation to the other stages of the policy process, especially policy formulation and program evaluation, and lastly, which are the basic assumptions that underlie the different modes of implementation analysis.

Key words: public policy, policy process, policy implementation capacity.

1. Some definitions and assumptions

In the beginning we need to address *three questions*: what we mean by policy implementation, and what is the relationship of implementation to the other stages of the policy process, especially policy formulation and program evaluation, and lastly, which are the basic assumptions that underlie the different modes of implementation analysis. All the way we should remember the famous caution of Browne and Wildavsky that "Implementation is no longer solely about getting what you once wanted but, instead, it is about what you have since learned to prefer until, of course, you change your mind again." (1984, 234)

Perhaps the most detailed (and, by natural extension, the most cumbersome) definition has been offered by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983, p. 20-21): "Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions. Ideally, that decision identifies the problem(s) to be addressed, stipulates the objective(s) to be pursued, and, in a variety of ways, "structures" the implementation process. The process normally runs through a number of stages beginning with passage of the basic statute, followed by the policy outputs (decisions) of the implementing agencies, the compliance of target groups with those decisions, the actual impacts of agency decisions, and, finally, important revisions (or attempted revisions) in the basic statute."

Such definitions attempt to capture the full range of implementation activities and, in that sense, might attempt to cover too much. A more satisfying definition would work to simplify the underlying concepts of implementation. Take, for instance, O'Toole 's definition of

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implementation: "Policy implementation is what develops between the establishment of an apparent intention on the part of government to do something, or to stop doing something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action." (2000, p. 266) Schneider and Ingram talk about affecting changes in behavioral patterns (i.e., getting constituents to cease doing one activity - say, speeding). The problem here, of course, is the issue of expectations and their subsequent evaluation (and reformulation). As many implementation scholars indicate, legislative decision makers are notably reluctant to provide exact maps that outline their expectations of policy results. Indeed, there is a controversy about this issue: some argue that excessive precision in defining goals may be counterproductive and deprive implementers of a valued flexibility. This stream of thought runs directly counter to that of others who suggest that the clearer the initial policy directive and the policy mandate, the more valuable the direction that is provided for the implementers to follow. This discussion does not even begin to take into account the expectations of the intended clientele, assuming they are of one mind or even that they can be identified.

The first pivotal assumption in implementation is that policy makers can be of one mind when it comes to operationalising a policy, for, at base, when multiple players are involved (and they almost always are), implementation becomes a battle to determine a correct reading of the mandate and its accurate execution. Failing this test, implementation is certain to become a welter of confusion. We have the example with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when President John Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered the navy to quarantine Cuba at the specified distance from the island, the navy command unilaterally (and without informing the president) extended that distance, recognizing that the closer distance would have exposed navy vessels to Cuban air strikes (see Allison, 1971). In short, both sides agreed on the quarantine (what we would term the policy mandate) but they had very different motivations as they carried out the implementation of the order and, hence, it's ultimate effectiveness.

The second basic assumption is that in many ways implementation and other stages of policy process are completely interactive in practice, although necessarily remaining distinctive in concept. For example, most implementation scholars agree on the importance of program evaluation as a key to good implementation, viewing evaluation as a way assess the implemented program and make suggestions as to how it can be improved. The problem is that formative evaluation (particularly in real time) is a notably imprecise activity, judging the relative success or failure of implementation *as a probable end product*. In a complex policy environment, it is rare that one set of variables can be identified as decisive, let alone dictate new policy implementation strategies.

The same is true about the relations between implementation and policy formulation. Policy implementation is often extended backwards in the policy process framework, as policy formulation in its purview as an attempt to remedy the implementation problems by addressing their origins in policy initiation. This moves the implementation analyst closer to what some have termed *policy design*. The fundamental problem with policy design is that it presupposes an ability to foresee future contingencies - that would be splendid if available but which all too often are not. This expansion does begin to indicate just how interactive the policy process stages appear to be, for to understand one, an analyst seemingly has to understand the mechanics of all.

Finally, there is *the alternative between two underlying assumptions* behind policy implementation and its major schools of thought (i.e., top down and bottom up). The first one assumed the existence of an authoritative, hierarchical (i.e., Weberian) *prime mover*, and therefore one need only minimize the communication distortions between that person (the principal) and his/her subordinate agents in order to effect successful implementation.

The alternative basic assumption is that bottom-up implementation - as a reflection of communal interest - will tend to be more realistic and practical, in that it suggests that the *vox populi* have a great deal of say about where they are going and how they choose to arrive. Moreover, a bottom-up orientation will be more conducive to a democratic approach to the policy implementation process than will the top-down (or a command) model.

Within the past decade, a number of policy scholars have made the brief for a more democratic approach to policy analysis, wherein constituents have a greater voice regarding the policies that will affect them. All of these indicate a trend toward a more discursive form of policy implementation, one that recognizes that there is *somebody* whose behavior needs to be modified in order that implementation will be considered successful, and that those *somebodies* might be more willing to conform to the new mandates if they were informed, and even more so if they consent, *before* the decision.

Conceptually, this would align policy implementation with a broader trend in the policy sciences toward a greater emphasis on the democratic ethos and citizen participation. I suggest that *more* democracy is better than less; that is, more direct forms should be preferred unless there are strong and articulated reasons to avoid them. A democratic approach to policy implementation would include reaching back in the policy process framework to include the policy formulation deliberations as a means to help define policy goals by talking with the affected parties well before the policy is adopted by the authorized policy maker.

There may certainly be implementation conditions in which a classic bottom-up or democratic approach would be ill advised. As Matland has pointed out in his critique of bottom-up analysis, "The institutional structure, the available resources, and the access to an implementation arena may be determined centrally, and substantially can affect policy outcomes" (1995, p. 150). But I would suggest that the conventional identification of national security, crises, and so on should not automatically be identified as conditions wherein democracy should be obviated; too often *automatic* is interpreted as *convenient*.

Concomitantly, there also may be conditions under which a democratic approach would be the dominant strategy. On balance, it's better to pose the following premise: when a policy implementation strategy is designed, a democratic approach *should be the preferred* (i.e., default) option. Implementation should follow democratic procedures (and preferably in the most direct democracy practices) unless prior analysis demonstrates that another model (e.g., a top-down, or command, implementation) is superior.

It would be foolhardy to assume that simply bringing together people in a room (or a stadium!) to discuss policy formulation and subsequent implementation will find them of one mind. Directly put, people can and will disagree, with some justification. But, at the very least, institutions can be designed that will promote and protect social discussions.

2. Policy Implementation Reforms: The Illusion Of Standardized Solutions

The idea of one best way - and of one best practice - is a tremendously seductive one. Each generation seems to go through a cycle of excitement at finding the best way, and then disappointment as more analysis and more studies appear to show that it is not, in fact, so universal in its effectiveness, and that it also has downside effects.

The public management reforms of the past 20 years have been extensively influenced by this cycle. We have been through (inter alia) periods of intense enthusiasm for the New Public Management, for 'Reinventing government' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), for partnerships and networks, and now, in the developing world context, for 'capacity-building'. Each of these has been prescribed, in varying doses, by the Anglo-Saxon world for use by the rest of the world - both developed and developing. Consider, for example, what Osborne and Gaebler said in their best-selling book, *Re-inventing government*: "If the rise of entrepreneurial government is an inevitable shift rather than a temporary fad, as we argue, one would expect it to happen in other nations as well [as the USA]. And to a startling degree, it has. A similar process of

transformation is underway throughout the developed world” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p. 328)

Unfortunately - or perhaps fortunately - contemporary scholarship has shown that there is no such standard solution. Neither ‘entrepreneurial government’ nor any other single approach has spread throughout the developed world – even in terms of rhetoric, let alone practice (Pollitt, 2002). This has been the finding from many comparative studies, conducted from several different theoretical perspectives (e.g. Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Christensen and Lægreid, 2001, Kickert, 1997) In a recent work on state-building and governance the American academic Francis Fukuyama put it like this: “That there are no globally valid rules for organizational design means that the field of public administration is necessarily more of an art than a science. Most good solutions to public administration problems, while having certain common features of institutional design, will not be clear-cut "best practices" because they will have to incorporate a great deal of context-specific information” (Fukuyama, 2004, p58)

I prefer 'craft' to 'art', but I agree with the main point. Recently the OECD (having at an earlier stage been rather a strong advocate of the NPM) has acknowledged the same point: “The mistaken perception that countries share a common problem is often accompanied by the idea that there is a smorgasbord of solutions available, any or all of which will be beneficial. This misconception, peddled under the label of "best practice", has had tragic consequences in some developing countries...” (OECD, 2003, p. 6)

Even if we step down from the level of ideologies, approaches and doctrines to the level of individual instruments or tools, standardized solutions are hard to find. Close analyses of such instruments as Total Quality Management (Zbaraki, 1998) or Regulatory Impact Analysis (Raedelli, 2002) or the creation of executive agencies all show tremendous variation in interpretation and implementation, sometimes even within a single organization (Joss and Kogan, 1995). These well-known techniques are not off-the-shelf engines ready to be plugged in to local problems. Rather they are loose assemblages of concepts and specific techniques which can be endlessly varied and interpreted (or misinterpreted) in local contexts. There are even internal wars between different gurus with competing conceptualizations of the same technique. Much, therefore, depends on the skill, resources and determination of local managements. And much depends on how long they are allowed for learning and implementation - not infrequently impatient leaders withdraw resources or move on to the next quick fix before there has been sufficient time for management to adapt and embed the new technique.

3. Variety As a Framework of Policy Implementation Reforms

The foregoing story of contextuality and complexity may seem a gloomy one. If there is no one best way, or even one best practice; if local factors can play such a significant role, if reform imports can be so long drawn-out and difficult, then is any kind of knowledge transfer really possible? Perhaps managers should return to a pre-global world in which local craft-skills are dominant and no more time is wasted trying to learn from elsewhere?

This is not the lesson which should be drawn from the recent and practice. Whilst knowledge of local norms and practices is very important (though sometimes neglected) element in policy implementation reform, that has not prevented social scientists from producing useful broad models of the process of management change. These models do not tell the reformer what to do in any particular circumstance - that would be impossible indeed - but they do suggest where to look and what to take into consideration. Though differing in detail there is widespread agreement that what is required is a wide assessment of formal and informal factors at several levels.

We should have in mind at least three of these analyses. First, there is Lynn, Heinrich and Hill's 2001 book, *Improving governance*. Moving from the more general to the more particular, they suggest that there are at least four groups of factors which demand attention: cultural environment, institutional framework, management strategies and relationships, and characteristics of the particular task or function (sometimes labeled as primary work level)

Second, there is Fukuyama's work *State-building*. He argues that there are four major components of institutional capacity: social and cultural factors, political basis of legitimation, design of institutions, and the design and management of individual organizations (2004, p. 42). Clearly there is some common ground between Lynn and Fukuyama.

Third, Pollitt (2003b) discusses at length the importance of: national and organizational cultures, structure of the political system (e.g. majoritarian, consensualist, etc), management doctrines, and primary task characteristics.

This is not to suggest there is anything like complete agreement among different theorists. There are many differences in definition and interpretation, and in theoretical allegiance, but some measure of agreement about what to look at is obvious. Building on this, it can be argued that, when a transfer of a particular management system or technique is contemplated, one needs to consider how far each of these *major factors* - *culture, the political system, the pattern of institutions, the management strategy, the nature of the primary task* - matches between the 'exporting' and 'importing' jurisdictions. The more mismatches, the more probable it is that the

transfer will fail or produce unexpected results. That is not at all to say that there has to be a perfect match, and that each mismatch spells doom for the transfer. But it is to say that each mismatch calls for attention - it is an aspect that itself may require careful management. Furthermore, at some point the number and depth of mismatches cumulate in the likelihood that the whole thing won't work. Exactly where that point will be is a difficult judgment (as suggested earlier, management reform resembles a craft rather than an art or a science). To some extent it will also depend on the energy, time and resources the importers are prepared to spend on the implementation process.

4. Agencification As a Key Policy Implementation Reform

On 18 February 1988, Mrs Thatcher, the then British Prime Minister, announced her acceptance of a report produced by the efficiency unit within the Cabinet Office, *Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps* (The Ibbs Report, 1988), which, she stated, 'recommended that to the greatest extent practicable the executive functions of government, as distinct from policy advice, should be carried out by units clearly designated within Departments, referred to as "agencies"' (*House of Commons Debates*, 18 February 1988, column 1149).

Executive Agencies are based upon a nominal separation of policy and 'operational matters' within departments. The government accepted the Ibbs Report recommendation that 'agencies should be established to carry out the executive functions of government within a policy and resources framework set by a department' (Ibbs Report 1988, p. 9). The clear assumption was that: "The main strategic control must lie with the Minister and Permanent Secretary. But once the policy objectives and budgets within the framework are set, the management of the agency should have as much independence as possible in deciding how these objectives are met ... the presumption must be that, provided management is operating within the strategic direction set by ministers, it must be left as free as possible to manage within that framework". (Ibbs Report 1988, p. 9)

The idea behind Next Steps is, thus, in Peter Kemp's words, "essentially a most simple concept, in some ways almost naive" (HC 313III 1996, p.107). Or as Derek Lewis put it more graphically, the concept of agency status 'is not rocket science, it is very simple basic management principles' (HC 313-III 1996, 94, q. 606). Agencies are simply administrative arrangements within departments, the functions exercised by agencies are vested in the department and not in the agency itself, so that the division of responsibilities between agencies

and departments is determined by the Framework Document and not by statute (see HC 313II 1996, 35).

The staff of agencies are still civil servants, working under civil service terms and conditions, financed by public finances and accountable through ministers to Parliament (Kemp in HC 313-III 1996, 107) - with the non-trivial exceptions of military and other civil staff who also work in agencies, an element ignored in confining the agency debate to questions of ministerial civil service relations. The delegation of tasks, and the extent of managerial devolution to the chief executive is outlined in the Framework Document. The officially proclaimed expectation is that once authority has been delegated ministers effectively 'withdraw' from operational matters – the daily, routine matters that have no general policy implications (Brazier in HC 313-II, 1996, 11). In this sense there would be a 'depoliticisation' of operational matters, but the extent of depoliticisation is limited in practice by the overarching accountability of ministers to Parliament.

In addition to the initial Framework Document, agencies are subject to a five-year cycle of 'Prior Options' reviews, so called because they include consideration of whether the activity should continue at all, be privatized, or organized in a different way. If the decision is to continue the activity as an agency, a new Framework Document is prepared.

There are also annual corporate plans, some of which are kept confidential to the agency and its department for commercial reasons, and annual reports laid before Parliament. An important annual element is the setting of targets for performance indicators, with the results being published in the consolidated annual *Next Steps Review*. So the officially proclaimed model is one of separation of policy and execution (implementation), operation within a Framework Document which specifies the roles of minister, main department and agency chief executive, and reporting on annual targets. Within that the chief executive is supposed to have operational autonomy, subject to the important caveat of continuing ministerial responsibility.

5. Policy Implementation Reforms and Executive Agencies: What Works?

To illustrate the idea of a matching analysis of key factors, we can consider the case of executive agencies. These have been a popular management innovation internationally, with programmes to create such semi-autonomous bodies being launched in, inter alia, Canada, Jamaica, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, the UK and the USA (OECD, 2002b; Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). The basic idea is that better performance will result when operational tasks are put at arm's length from ministries (disaggregation), entrusted to professional

management, and given a degree of flexibility (autonomy) with respect to finance, organization and human resource management. In return for these freedoms, the agency is required to operate within a contract-like framework which prescribes its output and outcome targets and its resource base. This three leg model (disaggregation, autonomy, contract) was pioneered during the 1980s by New Zealand (Crown Agencies) and the UK (Next Steps agencies). A number of other countries have explicitly based their own reforms wholly or partly on these pioneers (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004).

Behind this idea, however, we can see the shadows of the key factors identified in the literature cited in the previous section. Let us take these factors one by one.

National and organizational cultures. Modern agencies are a decentralized form, with significant management autonomy. Therefore to introduce them in cultures where loyalty to the centre is paramount, and/or where corruption is widespread, is to take a big risk. In a system such as Tanzania's, for example, agency steering from parent ministries cannot work well because informally everyone knows that it is the President and his Secretary General who wield the real authority (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). And in a system such as Latvia's or Bulgaria's, a culture of corruption surviving from the Communist period means that some agency officials are likely to interpret autonomy as a license for personal gain (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004).

The political system/basis of legitimation. Agencies are likely to develop in different ways in corporatist consensualist systems such as prevail in Sweden and Finland from their trajectories in two-party majoritarian systems such as the UK's or New Zealand's, or Presidential systems such as the American. In corporatist/consensual systems particular agencies may become the fiefdoms of certain parties, in a complex balancing act that makes sure that each major political grouping 'gets its share'. Furthermore, ministerial steering will be at least partly dependent on bargains within a coalition government. In majoritarian systems, however, the government can treat agencies in a more directive and technocratic way. In the UK agencies were first considered to be too closely controlled by their parent ministries, then too loosely controlled, so that some agencies and parts of agencies have been pulled back towards the ministries, all within the space of a decade. Even among majoritarian systems, much can depend on the extent of politicization of the senior public service. Thus, in the UK, it would be unusual for many agency chief executives to change following a change in the party in government. Just across the English Channel, in France, it would be rather common. Such factors are highly likely to influence the expectations and behaviors of agency management. Finally, we might mention how new Performance Based Organizations (PBOs) - partly modeled on UK Next Steps agencies - ran into

difficulties in the USA. Unlike the UK they were being inserted into a system with a strong and interventionist legislature, and this legislature ensured that the executive's original ambitious program of PBO creation was drastically reduced.

The institutional framework. Here the principal questions are: How centralized/decentralized is the system? How well-equipped are ministries to steer semi-autonomous bodies? In some central and eastern European states, ministries are seriously under-resourced for the steering task. They are short of staff familiar with performance management concepts and the skills relevant to designing indicator sets and monitoring performance against targets. They are short of experienced public lawyers, when disputes arise concerning the relative powers of ministries and semi-autonomous bodies. And they may be inhibited from recruiting the necessary skills by low pay and an 'iron cage' of central bureaucratic regulations pertaining to personnel management. For similar problems in other ex-Communist states, see Condrey, Purvis and Slava, 2001 and Miklos, 2000. But it is not only ex-Communist states which experience difficulty in steering semi-autonomous bodies. Sweden - which has longer experience of agencies than most countries, and which served as an admired model for UK reforms back in the 1960s - also seems to be a case where (for different reasons) ministries are rather under-powered relative to agencies (Molander et al, 2002; OECD, 1998).

Management strategies and relationships. What is the strategy of those managers charged with implementing agency reform? Is the plan that new agencies should be run by new blood - managers from other sectors than the civil service, or is it the intention to give these posts only to trusted and battle-hardened civil servants? In Japan, for example, some commentators have questioned how much autonomy agencies will really experience when most of those appointed as first wave chief executives were senior ex-bureaucrats (Yamamoto, 2004). Is agency reform being approached through cautious pilot projects (as in Canada), or is it being launched as a high-profile, large-scale program (as in the UK) or is it just being allowed to happen in an ad hoc rush (as in post-independence Latvia)? Or again, managerial relationships may vary considerably between the exporting and importing jurisdictions. For example, is individual initiative encouraged, or frowned upon? Do formal organizational relationships take precedence, or do ties of patronage, family or tribe cut across the workplace (Fukuyama, 2004)?

Primary task characteristics. This is a strangely neglected topic in recent public management literature. Yet there is a strong line of argument and evidence to the effect that the nature of the activity itself indicates that some types of management are more suitable than others. This was, for example, one of the themes of a modern classic text, James Q. Wilson's

Bureaucracy (1989). It is also a theme of other works, such as Lynn et al, 2001 and Pollitt 2003b. All these analysts point out that much depends on how far a given activity can be standardized, and how far and when its outputs and outcomes can be measured. These arguments have considerable relevance for modern executive agencies. Giving extensive autonomy to an agency which performs a standardized, easily measurable task is a very different matter from giving autonomy to an agency whose main outputs and outcomes are largely unobservable (a 'coping' organization, in Wilson's terms). In recent comparative research on agencies in four countries we found significant differences between primary tasks - for example as between social security agencies (where various key dimensions of benefit payment could be relatively easily measured) and meteorology (where understanding the measures of forecasting accuracy and high quality long-range research required considerable scientific knowledge). The expense of a task and its political salience are also often influences on how it is steered and managed (e.g. social security benefits may be easy to measure, but they are expensive; weather forecasts may be hard to measure, but at least they are, by government standards, relatively cheap and politically uncontentious).

This has been a brief worked example to illustrate the usefulness of thinking in terms of a degree of match between the exporting and importing contexts. As indicated earlier, this approach does not offer any easy or automatic decisions. But it does raise a series of important questions about the compatibility of borrowed management reforms to a new context. To put it simply, introducing the modern model of a disaggregated, autonomous, performance contracted agency is likely to go much easier in a context where the culture is already used to decentralized operations and where corruption is low, where ministries possess steering skills and resources, where agencies possess trained professional managers and where the tasks chosen for agencification are either readily measurable in output terms or (alternatively) where there is a cadre of professionals who have already internalized a public service quality ethic. As one removes each one of these contextual requirements the chances of the agency working in the desired form is lessened. If one removes them all, that chance is very small indeed.

Conclusions

The approach set out above implies that the borrower/importer of policy implementation reforms cannot afford to be a passive consumer of doctrines and techniques from 'advanced' countries. Public sector modernization does not proceed along a single line, with those who are 'further ahead' teaching those who are behind how to follow by installing certain standard and

reliable gadgets that will fix some set of universal problems. On the contrary, not only do countries start from very different places with different capacities, they may also want to go to rather different destinations (or, at the very least, have a different order of priorities in the medium term). Furthermore the available approaches and techniques are neither standardized nor, in many cases, well-tried and tested. Finally, some of the 'experts' promoting these approaches and techniques, have agendas of their own, which may not be identical with those of the importing jurisdiction. Even in near-ideal circumstances, with a well-evaluated technique being applied to a well-defined problem supported by advice from a trusted and reliable source, there are questions to be asked about the longer term. How long will the technique take to be fully bedded in? How will problems be handled after the initial period of advice and support is over, and the importer is left to face the longer term effects and requirements by themselves?

In conclusion, if this analysis is correct we can identify certain requirements to which the importer of policy implementation reforms would be well-advised to pay close attention.

First, the original analysis of the problem(s) to be solved needs to include an active input from those with local knowledge - not as humble assistants to the visiting 'experts' but as equal partners in crucial first step of arriving at an accurate diagnosis. This establishes what the nature of the issue 'here' actually is.

Second, the assessment of the proposed approach or technique also requires active input from the 'importer'. There is a need to perform a comparison of the cultures, systems, institutional frameworks, strategies and primary tasks of the place from where the approach/technique comes (where it has been applied and, hopefully, evaluated) and the specific context in which it is now to be applied. It is highly likely that local knowledge of the importing context will be as crucial to this stage as it is to the first, problem diagnosis stage. This second step therefore second step compares 'there' with 'here'

Third, there is a need for the importer to make provision for the bedding in and longer term appraisal of the import - not least because experience is quite likely to indicate, even if successful, that further modifications are needed after the initial set of modifications to suit the local context. That is to say little more than that all learning does not take place at the beginning. It implies that there needs to be a clear and continuing organizational responsibility, appropriately resourced, for the longer term nurturing of the reform. The wider scope the reform the more likely this is to be necessary. This third step makes provision for the transition from 'now' until 'then'.

Taken together, these three requirements point to a role for the importer which is both highly active and rather creative. To be successful, management reforms can seldom just be bought 'off the shelf'. Much more often they need to be co-produced.

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BEING COMPETENT AND BEING TRAINED: CHALLENGES FOR THE EMPLOYEES IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

Albena Taneva

Abstract

The paper is focused on the particular relationship between academic education and career development of graduate students in Public Administration as a transition towards a new model of public service.

The results of the public sector are highly dependent not only on the regulation of this sector, but largely on the preparation of the new generation for the civil service. Preparation is understood as competence, commitment and possibility for integration within the institutional system. As the standards for the academic education in Public administration exist, the biggest challenge in this regard is the philosophy of recruitment of the new graduates in Public Administration, the transition from the academic status to the status of practitioners and the sustainable development of the established models. Quite different is the challenge for training of experienced civil servants. This issue is particularly important in regard to the standards, purposes and values which the trainer is expected to fulfill.

The paper is focused on the particular relationship between academic education and career development of graduate students in Public Administration as a transition towards a new model of public service.

The results of the public sector are highly dependent not only on the regulation of this sector, but largely on the preparation of the new generation for the civil service. Preparation is understood as competence, commitment and possibility for integration within the institutional system. As the standards for the academic education in Public administration exist, the biggest challenge in this regard is the philosophy of recruitment of the new graduates in Public Administration, the transition from the academic status to the status of practitioners and the sustainable development of the established models. Quite different is the challenge for training of experienced civil servants. This issue is particularly important in regard to the standards, purposes and values which the trainer is expected to fulfill.

The empirical basis of this paper is a decade experience in conducting the internships for students in Public Administration at Sofia University as well training courses on leadership for practitioners in the training programs of the Department of Public Administration. Conclusions concern the impact of the Academic internship program on the recruitment, competence, job satisfaction and sustainable career of young employees in the civil service.

The paper is based on the two types of case studies:

- Reports of students of the internship program of the Sofia University Department of Public Administration
 - Basic criticism of students, based on their experience in variety of institutions of Public administration (negative experience, symptomatic issues; most repeated skepticism in the field of “real life” to the field of Public administration)
 - Positive issues (good practices, successful experience)
 - Factors for the positive results:
 - the role of the leader (institutional, educational, situational)

- the time factor (period of establishment and development of the programs in Public administration)
- alumni factor
- communication factor (intra organizational and inter institutional)
- Cases, developed by civil servants, trained in the programs of the Department of Public Administration in leadership (MA programs) and in communicative skills (training programs).
 - What was the most needed know-how by civil servants during their training;
 - What are the topics picked by trained civil servants as issues for their case studies (as good and bad practices and basis for benchmarking);
 - What is the role of the analyzed leaders in terms of improvement of administrative service and modernization of this sector.

I. Internships: From Competence to Training

The conclusions made in this report are based on ten years of experience accumulated with the Internship program of the Department of Public Administration at Sofia University. I mention the ten-year period purposely.

Taken alone, this is neither long nor short a period. Within the context of fundamental political and social changes experienced by the country, however, ten years seems to be a lengthy period. The late 90's was still the time to launch academic programs in Public Administration in Bulgaria. The old *Law on Civil Servants* in Bulgaria from 1922 was finally substituted with a new one to regulate civil service as late as 1999. At that time Bulgaria was actively engaged in the harmonization of its legislation with the EU legal system so as to reach one of the most important events in its modernity -- becoming a full EU member in 2007.

Why do I mention these facts? The reason is that they comprise the most essential elements of the situation in which both training and practicing of students in Public Administration were started in Bulgaria. Their importance lies in securing a positive environment in the country supportive of the idea that management requires expert knowledge as well as skills. Expertise in the area of management was represented for a very long time by the way of thinking of lawyers and economists. These are the two main approaches to formal rationality in management –i.e., a decision is considered good either if it conforms to normative prescription (identifying good governance as the legitimate government) or if it is grounded in financial efficiency (“the best price wins”). However if quality of life is considered as well as other related sociological motives the logic of public administration naturally goes far beyond these formal limits. In public sector management it may even happen that the more expensive alternative

could accumulate enough social motivation to be considered as the better one because of its special social consequences for the quality of life of people. Deploying a solution within the legal framework is only the first though sufficient step. Often decision alternatives conform to legal frameworks but still remain diametrically opposed –e.g., should a school be moved to a neighboring village or, rather, classes should be downsized, are 2 opposing though legally correct decisions. In their content, however, these decisions remain fundamentally different and reflect different philosophy -- what is good for people.

The academic program in Public Administration teaches students all this. They learn many law subjects in order to get acquainted with the legal framework regulating the decisions in the public sector. They acquire knowledge additionally in the area of public finance and economy via a number of economic and financial subjects. In this way they get familiar with the principles and good practices of securing economic efficiency and the relevant motivation of public management decisions. Furthermore the curriculum includes a definite number of social and political science subjects. This helps students become the kind of managers and experts who are close to the elegant definition of Herbert Simon for public administration as a “joint activity to achieve a non-profit goal.”

Our students are the product of the type of reasoning outlined above. Factors such as the good secondary schools students come from and their motivation to select Public Administration as their future occupation form a community of ambitious and interested young people who possess trust and understanding that the institutions of Bulgaria’s young democracy need better trained respectable young professionals who can make their living out of their work in their country precisely in the field they are prepared. The very atmosphere at the relatively young Public Administration departments is encouraging in that regard. For the entire four years of undergraduate studies students have the opportunity not only to get prepared by following a fundamental interdisciplinary program, but also participate in numerous scientific conferences and research projects. Cooperation between the founder of the department, Professor Tanev and the Brisby family from London led to the creation of the emblematic annual competition for student essay in the field of Public Administration which became emblematic of Sofia University’s PA school. It was founded as long time ago as the very first year of existence of the baccalaureate program. In addition to this practice there is organized also a permanent scientific seminar, annual conferences as well as the so called “Day of Public Administration at the University”. These initiatives contribute to the scientific integrity of the Department of Public

Administration at Sofia University and also to an inspiring and creative atmosphere for the individual development of each student not only as a knowledgeable future specialist but also as a positively thinking and well-oriented “artist” in the field of public sector governance.

This idyllic picture outlined above, however, is seriously challenged when students meet face to face with the world of practice. With the passage of time some problems in this regard are not as sharp as they used to be a decade ago but they still have some recurrence.

Here I would mention at the first place the prejudice of many Bulgarian civil servants graduates of Law or Economy schools who work in the area of public administration for a considerable period of time. Such civil servants tend to underestimate and misunderstand the specific education in PA and therefore have a negative attitude for the students. For many civil servants with law or economy background it is unclear why students in Public Administration who study so many law and economic subjects have not chosen to become directly lawyers or economists.

Another prejudice against getting qualified in Public Administration is the idea that this field is an occupation for the lower rank employees working in the front office. This becomes an obstacle to the understanding that knowledge in this highly professional area is a competence to participate in the upper levels of the civil service and management. Surprisingly, but even today it is possible to meet government officials who believe that students in Public Administration are prepared to work in offices as secretaries. As far as this issue remains at the level of psychological bias it can be resolved by the very fact of the abilities of our students. Many cases have been tackled exactly in this way. Therefore, competition with time is sufficient because graduates who refute skeptics are growing in number each year steadily.

Developing a multidisciplinary expert is combining approaches of different fields of study and appropriately balanced knowledge and practical training, students in Public Administration (I guess far not only from Sofia University) are suitable for any different types of occupations. They also *get more easily trained* to meet the specific requirements of their working assignment. It is interesting to note that our students make very clear distinction between these two different types of training -- to be competent and to be trained. Especially for this report, I conducted a survey with students undergoing internship. Virtually all the respondents replied that the most essential for them is the solid academic knowledge which they regard as their most important asset for the successful professional realization. Training is expected to be received at a later stage by the experience to be accumulated within the organization of their future assignment. Moreover, with surprising maturity for their age of 20 many respondents argue that to get trained

without prior possessing of the fundament of exhaustive theoretical knowledge makes no sense. This would be irresponsible and even dangerous because it would transform the civil servant from a morally responsible and knowledgeable expert into simple transmission of the will of high ranking officials who might pursue partisan or private goals regardless to the public interest and common good.

A far more serious prejudice against the discipline of Public Administration is contained in certain *recruitment policies*. The competitions for obtaining positions in administrations are organized in a way that limits the number of candidates only to those having economics or law diplomas. At the same time the description of the positions clearly demonstrates that the specificity of the job relates par excellence to the area of general administration.

This problem persists and is a serious obstacle to the career of graduates according to their actual training and specialization. Actually, this is an important topic for a separate analysis. It refers to the standards for determining the profile of the eligible candidate. Skepticism to the “Public Administration” brand (when demonstrated) interferes negatively with the possible recruitment of graduates of Public Administration for a public service

The reflections on the internship experience in the students’ reports mark a clearly recognizable trend of their values and attitudes towards professional training in the real working environment. Students are constantly critical of all cases where the host institution acts formally and is disinterested in their contribution.

There are several typical cases of underestimation of this sort:

- Treatment of internship students as technical assistants and secretaries;
- inability in the host institution to create organization in the workplace so as to integrate the trainee;
- students are given a document for the entire period of the internship on the very first day, as the supervisor has been convinced that this activity is a compulsory element of the academic program which is not really required by the students themselves;
- persistent indifference during the entire internship period of the representatives of the administrative office toward the trainees and acceptance of trainees as formal physical presence;

Fortunately, my experience in the organization of internships in the past 10 years has registered no more than 20 percent of such a treatment of students during their internship. The reason I comment these sporadic cases is due to the symptomatic reaction of the students themselves. They have always sought to overcome the problem and find ways to raise the interest

the host institution to their ability to contribute. Moreover, students have repeatedly discussed these cases during the preparatory lectures so as to prevent similar cases in future. All this is a clear evidence of how much PA students are concerned about their internship. The survey with the current participants in the program of the Department of Public Administration at Sofia University showed that almost each respondent believes that internships should expand their presence in the curriculum and obtain the statute of compulsory subjects included in the curriculum of each of the years of the Bachelor's program.

The opinions expressed in the open ended questions in the survey show that students identify clearly the difference between the knowledge they get from classes and from their experience as participants in the internship program. The academic part of the curriculum is understood as a form of basic *competence* one achieves as a student, while the knowledge obtained from the internship and from further assignments of the student is identified as training – particular algorithm of procedures and of the job requirements and duties. It is important to add that as far as the internship format and contents is concerned students have an unstable and not clear cut understanding unlike their perceptions about the academic part of education. The picture of the ideal internship shared in the answers to the survey is far more unstable and without clear standards when compared to the picture of their expectations from academic lectures in class.

The way in which students develop their skills during their course of study is entirely a product of the university departments of PA. No other instances participate in this process. In fact, this should be different. The creation of the standard for conducting the internship must be made by active dialogue with government officials and representatives of public management agencies since the internship is concerned with the important problem of human resource management in civil service. *Depending on whether the institutions of government have an active policy for recruitment in shaping their future employees and whether the state uses its capacity to influence the motivation of the most talented students to seek professional career in this field is a prerequisite for the capacity these institutions could have in future.* Their active role both in the formation/training of students would enable them to ensure both the reproduction of their institutions but also to improve the level of the entire output. This is a topic that deserves to be discussed in the international scientific community in public administration. In this number fall issues such as sharing of best academic practices in organizing training programs and the expansion of internships in public administration in European institutions, so as a step is made toward the formation of *a critical mass of common patterns of professional administrative culture in Europe.*

- **Positive issues (good practices, successful experience)**

The greater part of the internship experience, however, is in a different and much better situation. Although there are no standards of internship to follow and government officials themselves are not obliged to accept trainees, it is a true fact that, within the decade of organizing the internship program, I received only one single refusal for admission of students for internship by a particular office. The responsiveness of all addressed institutions so far is a symptom for a general positive attitude for cooperation with academic units and mainly for support of students in their future careers. It is also important to note that students are admitted to practicing despite the lack of due process and without financial compensation of anyone of the representatives of the offices or tutors. It becomes clear that the *diferentia-specifica* of this approach is the general positive attitude and commitment of each of the units concerned.

This is a sign of a favorable situation in which the accumulated experience allows that patterns are developed for academic internship programs to be followed further as templates instead of inventing them each year as unique arrangements. The internship for students is at the same time a good tool for the institutions of public management for identification of the type of knowledge and training that should be required from the newly recruited personnel. A more active role of state and local administration in the realization of academic internships could be a factor for better motivation of good students to connect their career with the civil service and also to help them discover the great variety of assignments in the field of Public Administration.

The cooperation between the academic units in Public Administration and the structures of government could positively influence resource availability of institutions with trained personnel. This would help graduates possess excellent academic competence but also adequate level of practical skills to work in institutions of public management. Moreover, the internship experience gives the opportunity actual preferences to be shaped by the real working environment. Thus, the behavior of fresh graduates at the labor market will be a purpose oriented action of those who seek professional development rather than of people who are just looking for a job.

The rule is that deeply committed and highly motivated employees contribute in a different way and at a different scale for the achievement of the objectives of the organization when compared to employees with formalistic behavior who work with the minimum skills required while looking for a better place for themselves.

- **Factors for the positive results:**

- the role of the leader (institutional, educational, situational)

The positive experience in the internship program is a result of several factors. First of all, these are the very personalities involved in the internship process. In fact, everyone who has contributed to the implementation of internships has done this out of responsiveness or foresight. The *responsiveness* concerns mostly academic entities and students who get the chance to be part of the real working environment. The foresight at the same time is demonstrated by all those institutions which manage to lead active policy in the recruitment through internship programs.

In this regard, the Department of Public Administration at Sofia University has a good experience with practicing a *network of inter-institutional partnerships* that lead to excellent results. Such collaborations gave the students an opportunity to participate in all stages of the organization of forums (e.g. with the Institution of the National Ombudsman, a State Institute of Culture Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Diplomatic Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to become an integral part of the daily activities of the directorates Public Administration and Strategic Planning at the Council of Ministers; with the Municipality, through its Department of Human Resources which provided the trainees with brief experience from many sections of the Municipality; and many other structures, which over the years has been found appropriate model for each case.

Part of the Internship program of the Department of Public Administration includes contact hours, which are designed for meetings with professionals from different sectors and occupations. All such meetings are dedicated to a particular topic. This helps students to understand the specificity of a certain approach to “self-actualization” – namely, these are discussions on the way individuals discover what kind of occupation they are looking for. The participation of students leads to the development of specific research tasks they get charged with by the partner institutions. Thus, trainees become familiar with the variety of issues in the everyday business of the institutions.

This ad hoc developed type for the organization of internships has by now led to positive results. Therefore the organizers can suggest patterns for academic internships in order to make them more efficient and productive for all of the parties involved.

- **the time factor (period of establishment and development of the programs in Public administration)**

The fact that Public Administration in Bulgaria is still a relatively new academic discipline is both an opportunity and a problem. It is an opportunity is contained in the

opportunity to start with an up to date program that corresponds to the latest developments in this field in leading European and American Universities. The problem on the other hand is that the development of this academic field is actually ahead of time in the local context, fighting with certain inertia in the perception on the side of the administrative institutions.

▪ **alumni factor**

The involvement of alumni in recent years turns into a rather positive factor. The presence of graduates of the PA school in virtually all public management institutions makes it easier to maintain internship activities. In addition to their *active support in the conduct of practice* within the particular institution, alumni make a significant contribution in strengthening the *integrity* of the Public Administration by taking part in events throughout the school year.

The Alumni Club initiated by the department lately turned out to be one of the important mediators in the organization of the internships. It made the organization process more efficient and reduced sufficient amounts of time spent initially for building contacts and introducing the entire process. The use of the Alumni Club is particularly helpful in taking greater care for the trainees during the period of the internship at the institution. It is also a better source of the feedback about the entire process for future improvement.

▪ **Training of civil servants: from training to new competence**

Cases, developed by civil servants, trained in the programs of the Department of Public Administration in leadership (MA programs) and in communicative skills (training programs).

○ **What was the most needed know-how by civil servants during their training;**

The University has always been a focus of new knowledge and free thought. In a sense, the University does the opposite of what an employee needs to learn to do in practice – it provides alternatives, questions the findings and a critical view on reality. Training of public officials offers them an opportunity for theoretical reflection on their experience:

- The very interruption of work rhythm is already helpful for each participant. The ability to find the focal point of different theories with specific, banal episodes from the working every day is an occasion for the employees to think of their experience in a new way. The idea of just how many opportunities there are to achieve a different result even with a small piece of change in the approach is a part of the achievement.
- Development of cases outlines a wide variety of topics: from trivial mistakes in the organization or non-ethical relations to serious deviations from the responsibility of a manager who neglects the proficiency of experts and fails in the fulfillment of a particular policy. Another group of cases deals with positive situations that describe a variety of

achievements of civil servants based on their wits, high sense of responsibility and commitment to the outcome for the community.

- Civil servants are not only educated but also trained to fit practice. Often this training is knowledge of the procedures for carrying out particular occupation. However, the shift from the competence to the training gradually interferes with monotonous rhythm which could substitute the needed level of inspiration for the work. When the organization of work in the civil service limits itself to formal implementation of procedures, it becomes a simple routine in turn and thus a prerequisite for bad practices.
 - **What are the topics picked by trained civil servants as issues for their case studies (as good and bad practices and basis for benchmarking);**

Briefly, these are cases that investigate the ability to influence development in a positive way through change in the organization as well as in the attitude of civil servants in order to cause advance in their work. Some ways to achieve good results stem from either improved communication or better relations and team building.

Training of civil servants in an academic program *allows identifying problem areas that do not require financial resources* in order to have them resolved. Good and bad practices are based not only on organizational, but very often on psychological reasons. Some bad practices require only a good will in order to get changed. Thus, the cases identified for educational purpose possess bigger potential. Indeed, their immediate purpose is to apply theoretical concepts to cases from real life. However, they are never used beyond this boundary. They remain unexploited as feedback to practice where they could exert their influence to improve the environment.

Compared with students who are just forming ideas of their future occupation and who have very little insight into the practice of civil service, the symptomatic stories, identified by civil servants are a valuable resource for academic training.

Certainly, students are very critical in respect of their internship experience. They are sensitive to both the lack of interest to them as trainees, as well as to any irregularity and poor organization noticed in the workplace. In a way, they are shaped as perfectionists by the universities and so they act during their first experience with the imperfection of practice. Students during their internship tend to never miss even the smallest inconveniences such as listening to music at work when this apparently interferes with the work of other, but remains not penalized either by supervisors or of equal ranking colleagues. They criticize the waste of resources due to poor organization (e.g. duplication of work already undertaken because of

unwillingness or inability to find ready-score). The reason for these trainees to share specific and seemed petty comments is due to their status of still outsiders to the system. Their point of view is actually purely theoretical and any deviation is seen as a matter of good will to be solved. So, for them bad practices are symptoms of certain deficit in the institution – lack of administrative capacity or indifference of some individuals. Deviations from the standards in organization and behavior in the workplace were of critical analysis and also by civil servants received training in academic programs on this matter.

- **What is the role of the leaders in terms of improvement of administrative service and modernization of public sector?**

Interpretation of cases in the context of leadership (according to concept of Burns) meets great interest and lively discussions. Understanding of leadership as a way of doing things is a good theoretical basis for reconsidering the number of practices. One of many illustrations of possible positive action is the case of the mayor in Kavarna. This is a particularly striking example in recent years in Bulgaria, which illustrates the potential of public authority to lead change and to lead to sustainability of results.

The parameters of this case are as follows:

This is one of the regions in Bulgaria, which is regarded as backward and without much potential for development. However, the local authorities have achieved massive change. In 2003 collected local taxes were about 450 thousand Bulgarian leva, and for 2006 year they raised up to 4 million leva. Unemployment was 22 percent and by the end of the first mandate of Kavarna's mayor it dropped to 6 percent. This example concerns the topic of this paper as key answer. It says that if there is will, it would be possible to find way to integrate the team towards achieving its goals. Amazing results can be fulfilled when it all starts with a dream and with someone who can point the community to the goals of its development and then have the will to put the necessary organization and perseverance into place. The 'carrier rocket' of Kavarna is called "rock music". But it wasn't exactly the rock music which made Kavarna an example of good governance. It was the management of the municipality, their vision and organization, which succeeded in linking their town with rock music and thus brought out the potential of their region.

Based on the conclusions by now, it is possible to agree that the new model of public service would mean well prepared, well trained, but mostly concerned civil servants. Indeed,

improving communication of public administration with the audience increases its potential for achieving results.

Creating this type of social integrity of the structures of public administration is a challenge that can be resolved only by truly dedicated to their profession staff. Achievements of this scale are possible when the new generations of students in Public Administration are not simply taken for short internships. They must be accepted as part of the reproduction of the administrative culture of the institutions. Until the establishment of standards for conducting training courses and special policies of the institutions of state administration for recruitment of personnel, the active entity for the connection of "education" with "practice" in fact remain academic units.

CIRCUMVENTING THE EAST-WEST CULTURAL IMPASSE: EXPLORING MEANS OF BOLSTERING GLOBAL DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT BY FOSTERING NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION WITHIN TIME ZONES¹

Todor Tanev

Any attempt at cultural hegemony threatens global democratic development. The modern world faces Huntington's apocalyptic prediction that the clashes between cultures will become the future front lines of global politics². History is indeed filled with such clashes, while examples of cooperation are few and far between. Intercultural dialogue has always been the primary countermeasure, but it has proven inefficient. *Cultural conflicts are persistent and therefore difficult to manage.*

On the other hand, attempts to impose certain cultures over others in the era of globalization have led to their self-destruction. Sizeable segments of existing cultures can be preserved, however, if they choose the alternative to take part in global cultural development by offering those unique elements, which also represent universal values. *Countries that do not impose their entire national cultural model but act the framework of internationally meaningful compatible segments of it are expected to gain broad and systematic international support.*

Additionally, thinking in such broad terms as “civilizations” leads to false statements. For example, it is false that Islam itself is a problem instead of Islamic fundamentalism³. It is a mistake not to take into account the internal cultural divisions present in all civilizations⁴. The problem is not the clash between “our values” and “their values,” but between our declared values and our short-term interests⁵.

These observations necessitate the search for new global guidelines for strengthening democracy. Overcoming cultural conflicts is not the only method, and they can be tackled from other directions. Processes in North Africa, India and China do not stem from the global cultural clash. *Instead of dialogue between civilizations, it is better to look for opportunities to create*

¹ text based on published description of a Project with the same title developed for the National Endowment for Democracy, USA in the e-magazine <http://ejpp.eu/index.php/ejpp/article/viewFile/85/71>

² “The Clash of Civilizations”

³ Bulliet, R., The case for islamo-christian civilization, Columbia University Press, 2004

⁴ Said, E. W. The Clash of Ignorance, <http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance>

⁵ Loy, D. R. The West Against the Rest? A Buddhist Response to „The Clash of Civilizations”, <http://www.inebnetwork.org/thinksangha/tsangha/loy-westrest.html>

networks of parties who have an interest in enacting common policies. Such linkages may ease cultural rivalry and strengthen democratic development.

Therefore the proposed project is for examination of the prospects, creation of a strategic framework and making the first specific steps for cooperation in certain segments of the North-South axis, which are not challenged by cultural rivalry and offer an innovative means to positively impact democratic development. It does not claim to offer a universal solution. Rather, its aim is to look for opportunities in suitable international communities, such as *one of the 24 time zones*. Another limitation is that only some countries with certain experience in the democratic transition may join the initiative from the outset. These may be *South Africa plus some European countries* -- an issue that should be investigated.

Significance

Civilizational clashes seem to be justified primarily in the context of archaic cultural (not geographical) separation between the “individualistic” West and the “collectivist” East. Because there is *no rational conflict of interest*, finding a logical and lasting solution seems impossible. Alleviating the chronic problem of conflicting values by *seeking dialogue and preaching tolerance seem ineffective*. The approach of seeking “unity in diversity,” which does not work even in Europe⁶, is doomed to fail because it presupposes differences and remains closed in its historically burdened context.

Dialogue should be an important auxiliary tool of democratic development, instead of the primary instrument. It simply does not eliminate the social causes of cultural conflict. Dialogue is an element of negotiation, which encourages each side to protect its interests. Therefore, it does not guarantee that parties will remain vested in their cooperation, as well as in their common policies⁷. Outside factors begin to play the primary role: who, how, for how long and for what purpose prompts, directs and maintains a dialogue. Ineffective dialogue is more dangerous than the complete lack of dialogue.

Therefore the project should first assess (1) the strengths and weaknesses of existing international East-West initiatives, (2) the extent to which alternative North-South cooperation routes offer solutions, (3) whether the new approach is realistic and its limitations, (4) the prospect of linking the idea of intra-time-zone North-South cooperation with the existing East-

⁶ Something that Amartya Sen calls “Pluralistic Monoculturalism”

⁷ Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right.

West clashes and (5) whether the idea of collaboration unbound by historical context can be embedded into one of the major UN initiatives for global democratization, to give it new impetus, or vice versa, whether it can be developed independently as something fundamentally different.

In this context, many initiatives to mitigate the conflict between civilizations exist both within and outside the UN: the Alliance of Civilizations, the UN Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations (2001), UNESCO, the EU, the Anna Lindh Foundation, Cultural Corridors of South East Europe, etc. However, it seems that none go beyond the creation of dialogue between opposing cultures. They do not recognize the limitations of dialogue. Also, because their objectives and activities overlap, they are competitors rather than allies in promoting intercultural dialogue. The idea of strengthening historically unencumbered cooperation should not compete with existing schemes for intercultural reconciliation.

The project concept particularly concerns the UN initiative “*Alliance of Civilizations*” and the extent to which the idea of North-South cooperation can be tied to it.

The Alliance of Civilizations, proposed in 2005 by the prime ministers of Spain and Turkey, was approved by over 70 countries, including the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, both in terms of its structure and its objectives⁸. Its main assumption is that it can reduce the risk of the creation of a “wall of misunderstanding” between the West and the Muslim world by encouraging dialogue surrounding “mutual understanding and respect.” It features measures in four key areas of cultural understanding⁹: education, media, youth and migration. Among its projects is the creation of a UN Institute for the Alliance and a summer school for young people¹⁰. However, it lacks an established mechanism for decision-making and its source of funding is not secured.

I find that the initiative is reminiscent of a permanent round table between the two worlds under the supervision of Turkey and Spain, led by their national interest to become mediators¹¹. The initiative has a clear East-West orientation¹². “The Alliance” is designed as a partnership between ministries and certain UN departments. Civic and private organizations are included only insofar as implementing centralized government strategies.

⁸ information following from interviews with officials at the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

⁹ <http://www.mfa.bg/bg/pages/view/270>

¹⁰ The Regional Strategy for Intercultural Dialogue and Cooperation in Southeast Europe is the first regional document within the initiative.

¹¹ Republic of Turkey, Alliance of Civilizations, National Strategy

¹² <http://africa.mfa.gov.tr/mopy-sunusu.en.mfa>

More importantly, this initiative is formed by both distant historical elements and more recent chapters in political history including the Cold War. Like most initiatives, this model is based on polarization. The West must cease to be a pole and become assimilated in many key areas, including trade, science and culture. The West should become a partner to the rest of the world rather than attempt to reshape its unique identity and assert its universalism.

Existing initiatives are the works of practicing politicians. In contrast, the exploitation of the relatively unexplored prospects for active common policy-based North-South cooperation can provide a ground for innovation and realism. This broadens the group of actors -- *besides politicians the group of partners would include also scholars, public figures, businessmen and internationally respected activists.*

Hypothesis

The project proposed is based on a hypothesis resulting from the dramatic changes in the effectiveness of instruments used in the development of democracy in the current *era of globalization.*

The first aspect of the leading hypothesis is that *international East-West relations are jaded by an unproductive cultural and historical context, unlike most North-South relations;* therefore, the shift in balance between the two axes, i.e. activation of various North-South interactions, can be used to gradually reduce cultural tensions along the East-West axis. Can the strengthening of beneficial common practices along the North-South “Axis of Cooperation” discourage its participants from continuing to fight their futile cultural battles along the East-West “Axis of Confrontation”? In what areas should we look for such opportunities? Which aspects of the relations along the North-South axis have a realistic potential to turn it into an “Axis of Cooperation”?

Another aspect of the hypothesis is that *in a globalized environment intercultural dialogue loses its effectiveness as a tool to strengthen democratic development.* Therefore, it is productive to seek alternative means. Globalization, in fact, brings a growing scope of opportunities in this respect. Cooperation within certain organizations involved in the implementation of joint policies becomes essential. Could the creation of dynamic supra-national organizations pave the way for an integrated networking society of the future to replace the current model of isolationist cultures?

The hypothesis has yet another aspect. Intercultural dialogue relies on intellectual tools, such as education. Meanwhile, *the relations surrounding history and culture could rest on a*

wider foundation of interaction amongst the government, private and civil sectors. Is it conceivable to organize joint annual meetings of governments, public and private partnerships or business initiatives, which aim to strengthen democratic development?

Last but not least, instead of pushing dialogue between conflicting parties, in the modern world, it is now possible to engage in *efficient public diplomacy of good democratic practices within nonbiased international publics.* Is it possible to include international academic and intellectual circles in the propagation of democratic best practices, separately from the routine actions of foreign ministries?

Limitations

The aim of this project, unlike existing initiatives, is not to strive for universal applicability. Not all North-South relations are devoid of cultural confrontation, and then there are those that are simply irrelevant to the strengthening of democracy. The study is based only on appropriate and relevant sectors of the North-South axis (for instance some time zones), and covers not only the public sector, but also the private sector and civil society.

Thus the constructed model will be limited to the time zone GMT +2. This is one of the largest zones with 29 countries, which is particularly suitable for the conceptual design. This time zone crosses through several very distinct geopolitical subgroups: starting with the Baltic States (Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), former European USSR members (Belarus, Ukraine) to the north, through parts of the Balkans (Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria) and the Middle East (Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Libya) and down to a large swath of Sub-Saharan Africa (Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo; and finally South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia. Each subgroup has historically been affected in its own way by the traditional East-West conflict. But from a North-South perspective, it is hard to find traces of this conflict between the groups unlike other time zones. Specifically, none has dominated over the other. Can these areas converge and work together more as a mechanism supporting democratic development?

The project does not necessarily place the emphasis on states but rather focuses on the unused capacity of business, scientific and public circles, specifically organized for this purpose. This may be a first step towards common policies ending in joint projects (academic and scientific programs, trade projects, etc.) and even the gradual formation of a common elite in the area.

Project Goals

The Time Zone project involves both research and practical part. It should be focused on creating practical products like:

- (1) A *Strategic Framework for North-South Cooperation* outlining areas of common policies
 - (2) A Model of an international think-tank in time zone GMT +2
 - (3) A *Roadmap of North-South Cooperation* containing exemplary initiatives: joint bilateral annual cabinet meetings, festivals, free trading zones, etc.
 - (4) A Model for management and financing of future initiatives
 - (5) A Model for public diplomacy in the time zone propagating the best practices to avoid cultural conflicts in different countries
 - (6) Model of an international conference to boost the development of practical ideas for North-South cooperation
- Etc.

The project has several elements that form a system. None of them can be omitted for that reason. Before the activities however the primary step is the creation of a *Strategic Center* of the project. This center should include just several figures with complementary expertise, but equally attracted by the prospects of the project. They should combine political, research, multicultural and administrative capacities. By definition, this core team should have an international profile. Once formed, the Strategic Center should design, manage and control the implementation of the Time Zone project.

These elements are:

- Political
- Research
- Strategic plan
- Organizational
- Administration

In more detail:

Political: The first task of the Strategic Center is to make the project politically and economically feasible. Its goals as well as various details should be discussed with political figures and changes to the initial idea should be made in order to secure political support to the project. This will lead further to a financial support.

Research (exemplary schedule):

Activity	Method
Research on the impact of globalization on democratic development; identification of the leading values and defining a mission	Analysis of existing theories; Interviewing experts; Historical Analysis
Analysis of latest research on North-South international relations and outlining a North-South Model of policy networking	Secondary Analysis of existing research results (e.g. The North-South Institute, The Institute of the North, etc.); Interviewing experts
Critical comparative analysis of theories and practices of East-West relations: classifying their positive and negative aspects and comparing this model with the North-South model	Own analysis; Interviewing experts
Strategic analysis of the potential of the groups of countries within the GMT +2 time zone for cooperation in the North-South axis; Vision Statement	Case Study; Historical Analysis; Interviewing experts; Applied Strategic Analysis of (1) Competitive Advantage, (2) Strategic Sets; Brainstorming Session
Identifying the areas with highest potential for common policies for democratic development in the North-South context	Secondary Analysis of existing research results; Policy Analysis; Interviewing experts; Brainstorming Session
Creation of models: (1) an informal public diplomacy, (2) management and financing of initiatives in the time zone, (3) generation and selection of initiatives	Own analysis; Consultation
Analysis of the practical aspects for future development of the concept: (1) modeling a time zone think-tank, (2) modeling an international conference for development of the time zone concept	Consultation
Critical self-assessment of the work	Ex ante and ex post control; critical overview of the work completed by tutor and 2 experts

Strategic Plan: A plan for international cooperation of this rank which is not a typical action of a single state requires a strategic plan supported by participating countries. Only when this project is strategically managed it could secure the necessary level of consent among different participating parties and thus significant durability and viability. The plan should contain a detailed strategic framework and short (e.g. 2-year) plan of action followed by budget.

The organizational and administrative elements of the project would follow from that plan.

In the early stages of conceptualization of the project concept it would be most effective and efficient that ideas are developed in the same way the project is developed in future – in a cooperative, inclusive, dialogical manner. Consent is the key to the success of such a plan because it contains uniquely no element of competition at all. Therefore full consent (not consensus though) is not only possible but also necessary. So, may the project is set on the practical grounds of an international think-tank starting from its early formative stage.

AUTHORS



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